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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DWIGHT L. KING, Administrator of
the Estate of 'YENDELL 0. JORGENSEN, Deceased,
Plaintiff a.nd Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 7338

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMpANY, a corporation,
Defendarnt a(nd Appellant.

c:ATEMENT OF CASE
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

In this brief the parties will be referred to as in the
Court below, plaintiff and defendant.
All italics are ours.
As indicated in appellant's brief, this is an appeal
from an order of the Honorable Clarence E. Baker, one
of the Judges of the Third Judicial District Court, granting plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial.
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During the afternoon of October 28, 1947, Wendell
0. Jorgensen, an employee of defendant, while engaged
in the ·performance of his duties as brakeman, suffered
fatal injuries when he fell from the platform on the leading end of a caboose being propelled along ahead of defendant's train, and was thereupon run over by the caboose, engine and several cars.

It was undisputed that defendant (a) made up the
train with the caboose in front, and moved the train
from Idaho Falls to the place where deceased was killed,
a distance of over ten miles, and that (b) defendant's
Operating Rule 802 ( J), then in force, provided:
''Cars must not be handled ahead of engine
between stations, except when necessary to take
cars to or from a spur or in work train service
and the movement then must be for no greater
distance than necessary.''
and that (c) the caboose was a large boxcar converted to
a caboose, and that (d) there was a great amount of
swaying and pitching of the caboose while being moved
over defendant's unballasted branch line tracks where
the fa tal event took place, and that (e) deceased was
required to perform his duties on the forward end of
this caboose under the aforesaid conditions, and that (f)
the safety chain across the aperture at the forward end
of the platform was unsafe and inadequate in that the
hook of said chain was so short that it would come unhooked when struck from beneath and that it failed in
its function and became unhooked when deceased fell or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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was thrown against it, thus causing him to fall forward
onto the tracks in front of the moving train.
~\t the time of his death deceased was 36 years old.
He left a wife 31 years of age, a son 11, and a daughter
4. He had 9 years seniority as a brakeman and conductor
and was earning a little over $400.00 per month. During
the year 1946 he earned a little over $5,000.00 and during
19-!7, prior to his death, earned $4,12·5.00. He habitually
delivered his checks to his wife, who paid all bills and
family expenses. ·He contributed on an average of between $300.00 and $350.00 per month to the support of
his family and home. (See ~r rs. Jorgensen's testimony,
R. 578 to 587).

Prior to his fatal injury he was a strong, husky,
able-bodied man.
The computed value of $300.00 per month over deceased's life expectancy, based on the United States
Tables of Mortality, 1939-1941, Department of Commerce, as revealed by Exhibit 8, discounted at the rate
of 3%, was $76,019.52, and as based on the American
Experience Tables of Mortality, discounted at the rate
of 3% (Exhibit "J") was $72,716.68.
The jury returned a verdict of ''No Cause of
Action.''
The trial court set the verdict aside and granted
plaintiff a new trial. The new trial resulted in verdict
for the plaintiff in the amount of $75,000.00 which was
reduced to $50,000.00 by the trial court. Defendant has
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not based his appeal herein on the judgment rendered
on the second verdict.

:)~ ~

SUMMARY OF ARGUM:ENT
In presenting respondent's Reply Brief to this Court
we shall discuss the following matters:
(A) THE LAW WITH RESPECT TO THE DISCRETIONARY POWER OF ~TRIAL COURTS IN ACTING UPON ~10TIONS FOR NEW TRIAL, under
the following points and subtitles:
POINT I.
A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS ADDRESSED TO THE
SOUND DISCR.E'TION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND ITS
RULING WILL NOT BE REVERSED UNLESS ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IS CLEARLY SHOWN.

( 1) 'The rule as established by the Supreme Court
of Utah.
(2)

The rule as established by the Federal Courts.
POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETIONARY POWER TO
ACT UPON A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IS PART AND
PARCEL OF THE RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY AND THE
EXERCI:SE OF SUCH POWER DOES NOT INVADE SUCH
RIGHT.

POINT III.
WHERE THERE IS CONFLJ1CTING EVIDENCE ON THE
QUESTION OF LIABILITY THE GRANTING OF A MOTION
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FOR NEW TRIAL BY THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT AN
ABlJSE OF DISCRETION AS MATTER OF LAW.

( 1) The rule as adopted and followed by the Supreme Court of Utah.
(2} The rule as adopted and followed by the Federal Courts.
(3)

The rule under California decisions.

(B) THE TRI~-\.L COURT EXERCISED SOUND
AXD JrST DISCRETION IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S )lOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
(1) Defendant made up its train with the caboose
ahead of the engine with full knowledge or means of
knowledge that in so doing it thereby subjected its brakemen to unusual and unnecessary danger and hazard.
(2) There was no necessity or reason for placing
the caboose ahead of the train and in making up and
operating its train, as it did, defendant violated its own
operating Rule 802 ( J).
(3) Jorgensen's place of work, the platform on the
leading end of the makeshift caboose as it was being propelled along, was dangerous, hazardous and unsafe.
(4) The makeshift safety chain (Exhibit 1) was
inadequate, unsafe and dangerous and due to its insufficiencies was likely to and did become disengaged and
failed in its function when put to the test of use.
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(5) The fatal event was proximately caused by defendant's various acts of negligence, combined and concurring.

-r•

·''""'

(C) GROUNDS URGED BY PLAINTIFF IN
THE TRIAL COURT IN SUPPORT OF HIS Ivt:OTION
FOR NEW TRIAL.
GROUND I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO.7 (R. 110).

GROUND II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO ADEQUATELY INSTRUCT THE JURY ON PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF LIABILITY AS SET FORTH AND CONTAINED IN PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS
NOS. 3 AND 6 (R. 96, 99).

GROUND III.
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 11
AND 12 (R. 75, 76) WERE ERRONEOUS AND CONS.TITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

GROUND IV.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN RECEIVING DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT "4", THE
MOVING PICTURE FILM, IN EVIDENCE AND PERMITTING DEFENDANT TO DISPLAY SUCH FILM TO THE
JURY IN LIEU OF ARGUMENT.
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THE L~\'V 'YITH RESPECT TO THE DISCRETIONARY POWER OF TRIAL COURTS IN ACTI~G UPOX ~lOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL.
POINT I.
A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS ADDRESSED TO THE
SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND ITS
RULING WILL NOT BE REVERSED UNLESS ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IS CLEARLY SHOWN.

(1) The rule as established by the
of Utah.

Sup~em.e

Court

Defendant admits in its brief that in order for it to
prevail on this appeal it must sustain the proposition that
the trial court abused its discretion in granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial. We do not believe defendant has sufficiently presented the Utah law on this subject. Defendant apparently is in disagreement with this
Court on the requirements necessary to establish abuse
of discretion.
This Court in Moser v. Zion's Co-op. MerDantile Institution, et al, 197 P. (2d) 136, at page 139, decided August 2, 1948, reviewed its former decisions and declared
the law on this point in the following language:
"It is a matter now too well settled to admit
of any serious dispute (and appellants do not contend otherwise) that the question of granting or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
denying a motion for new trial is a matter largely
within the discretion of the trial court. White v
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 8 Utah 56, 29 P. 1030;
Van Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Utah 606,
161 P. 50; Utah State National Bank v. Livingston, 69 Utah 284, 254 P. 781; Thompson v. Bown
Live Stock Co., 74 Utah 1, 276 P. 651; Jensen v.
Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P. 2d 708. This rule
applies whether the motion is based upon insufficiency of the evidence or upon newly discovered
evidence. S.ee cases above cited and Vali otis v.
Utah-Apex Mining Co., 55 Utah 151, 184 P. 802;
Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 25·5, 53 P. 2d 1155; and
Trimble v. Union Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457,
142 P. 2d 674. This court cannot substitute its
discretion for that of the trial court. James v.
Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 117 P. 1068, 2 N.C.C.A.
782. We do not ordinarily interfere with rulings
of the trial court in either granting or denying a
motion for new trial, and unless abuse of, or failure to exercise discretion on the part of the trial
judge is quite clearly shown, the ruling of the trial
judge will be sustained. Lehi Irrigation Co. v.
Moyle, et al., 4 Utah 327, 9 P. 867; White v. Union
Pacific Ry. Co., supra; Utah State National Bank
v. Livingston, supra; Clark v. Los Angeles & S.
L. R. Co., 73 Utah 486, 275 P. 582; and Trimble
v. Union Pacific Stages, supra. See also Harrison
v. Sutter St. Ry. Co., 116 Cal. 156, 161, 47 P. 1019,
1020.''
This Court from its earliest days has recognized
the wide discretionary power residing in trial courts in
acting upon motions for new trial. In one of its earliest
decisions, Newton v. Brown, 2 Utah 126, 130, this Court
held that large discretion is vested in the trial court in
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refusing or granting a motion for new trial based upon
the insufficiency of evidenre, and stated:
''In the case before us, the record shows that
the testimony was, to say the least, very conflicting, and in such cases the granting or refusing a
new trial rests peculiarly in the discretion of the
court. \Yeddel v. Stark, 10 Cal. 302; Brady v.
0 'Brien, 23 Cal. 243.''
In Davis v. Utah Southerrn R. R. Co., 3 Utah 218, 224,
2 P. 521 (1882) this Court declared:
"The appellant's proof of negligence was very
meager and unsatisfactory, and was met by proof
quite as strong, if not more convincing, of the
entire absence of any negligent, unskillful, or
reckless management of the respondent's engine
on the occasion referred to. To say the least, the
evidence upon this point was conflicting. Where
there is a substantial conflict of evidence on a
material point, this court will not revise the discretion exercised by the disttrict court in granting
a new trial. Newton v. Brown, 2 Utah, 126."
In White v. Union Fac. Ry. Go., 8 Utah 56, 57, 29 P.
1031 (1892), this Court held that where the evidence was
conflicting the granting of a motion for new trial by the
trial court was in nowise an abuse of discretion. The
Court stated:
''One of the grounds assigned in the motion
for a new trial is that the evidence was insuffiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cient to sustain the verdict. There was a manifest
conflict in the evidence. If the plaintiff is to be
believed, he was entitled to recover. If, however,
the two witnesses who contradicted him on the
vital question of his being forcibly ejected from
the defendant's cars are to control, the evidence
was clearly insufficient to sustain the verdict. The
rule is ; When a motion is made for a new trial
because of the insufficiency of the evidence, and
the testimony is conflicting, the granting or refusing a new trial is largely in the discretion of
the trial court, and its act will not be overruled
unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.''
In Tousey et al, v. Etzel et .al., 9 Utah 329, 337, 34 P.
291 (1893), the trial court granted a motion for new trial
without specifying the ground. However, one of the
grounds set out in the motion was the insufficiency of
evidence. The Court declared:

'' * * * If it was granted on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict,as we presum·e it was,-it is well settled that a
motion for a new trial on such ground is addressed to the sound legal discretion of the trial
court, and that such an order will not be reversed
on appeal, unless it appears that there has been
manifest abuse of such discretion.''
In Monmouth Pot)llery Co. v. White, 27 Utah 236, 75
P. 622, this Court held that unless abuse of discretion
clearly appears the action of the trial court in granting
a new trial will not be disturbed.
A consideration of the authorities cited by appellant
here will disclose a confusion in concept as to the relative
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l~ 1

11
powers and authority of appellate courts and trial courts
to order new trials.
In James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 432, 117 P. 1068,
this Court recognized the distinction and stated:
''While the district court, in the exercise of a
sound legal discretion, without basing his ruling
upon any specific error of law, may, under certain
circumstances, posse.ss the authority to grant a
new trial, yet we cannot do so, nor can we exercise
the discretion which the district court might, and
in some cases perhaps ought to have, exercised.
In cases like the one before us, where all other
assignments fail, and the only avaiZable assignment is that the ev~dence does .wot jus t'ify the verdict of tl1e jury, arnd where the trial oourt has refused t.o grant ·a new trial, ·all that we ~are authorized to do is t.o look into the evidenae t,o ascerbairn
whether there is .any subst,antial evidence in support of every material element which plaintiff is
required to est·ablish in order to recov·er. If there
is such evidence, then, so far as we are concerned,
the verdict must stand, although in our judgment,
if we passed on the facts, the verdict upon the
whole evidence should have been to the contrary.
Nor can we, under the guise of ~reviewing an abuse
of discretion by the trial court in refusing to grant
a new trial upon the ground that the verdict is
not supported by the evidence, pass upon the
weight of the evidence. What the district judge
might, or even should, have done in this regard
we may not do for him, simply because he refused
to do it."
1

In Valiotis v. Utah-Apex Mining Co., 3:1 Utah 151,
184 P. 802 at 807, the Court considered the relative
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powers of the appellate and trial courts to grant or deny
new trials. In that case plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for personal injuries. The evidence was
conflicting and after verdict and judgment for plaintiff,
defendant moved for a new trial, one of the grounds being insufficiency of evidence. Defendant's motion was denied and it appealed. Defendant did not contend that
there was no evidence to support the verdict, but did contend that the verdict was palpably against the weight of
the evidence and that the trial court abused its discretion
by denying the motion for new trial. The Court stated:
"While the trial court may, as we have seen,
review the evidence, consider its weight and the
credibility of witnesses, and grant a new trial, if
satisfied that there is a marked and clear preponderance of the evidence against the verdict, it
is quite generally held that an appellate court has
no such discretion.

* * * *
''The granting or denial of a motion for new
trial founded on the insufficiency of the evidence
to justify the verdict, where the evidence is conflicting, rests in the sound legal discretion of the
trial judge, and the question directly involved on
appeal is whether or not that discretion has been
improperly exercised or abused. As said in the
case of Harrison v. Sutter 'St. R. Co., 116 Cal. 161,
47 Pac. 1020:
" 'That the granting of a new trial is a thing
resting so largely in the discretion of the trial
court that its action in that regard will not he disturbed except upon the disclosure of a manifest
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and unmistakable abuse has become axiomatic and
requires no citation of authority in its support.' ''
In Perrin v. Cnion Pac. R. Co., 59 Utah 1, 201 P.
-103. -107, this Court considered the power of the trial
court to grant a motion for a new trial in a case arising
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The first
trial resulted in a verdict for defendant "No Cause of
Action." The district court granted a new trial. The
case was again tried and a verdict for plaintiff rendered.
As in the case at bar defendant appealed from the judgment entered on the verdict and contended that the trial
court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial
after the first verdict. It is to be observed that the defendant here does not cite or refer in any way to the Perrin
case. The defendant in that case argued, as the defendant does here, that there was testimony in the record
from which the jury could reasonably conclude that plaintiff had failed to establish her right to recover and that
it was, therefore, error on the part of the district court
to grant a new trial. The trial court indicated in ruling
upon the motion for a new trial that ·error had been committed by failure to instruct upon an issue presented by
the pleadings, the court being of the opinion that there
was sufficient evidence to carry the issue to the jury. The
Supreme Court held that the evidence on the issue was
insufficient but nevertheless sustained the trial court.
We quote:

'' * * * no opinion is expressed as to whether
granting a new trial would have been an abuse of
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discretion if there had been no other grounds
authorizing or justifying such action.

* * * *
" * * * It was. the duty and privilege of the
district court, in considering the motion for a new
trial, to determine whether the jury had given due
weight to this uncontradicted testimony. If in the
court's judgment the jury had failed to give such
weight to the testimony as it was entitled to receive, it was no abuse of discretion to grant a new
trial. Rison v. Harris, 50 Okl. 764, 151 Pac. 584.
Our statute relating to new trials is taken from
the California Code. Consideration of the weight
of evidence on motions for new trial is peculiarly
within the province of the trial courts, as has frequently been held by the Supreme Court of that
state. Sherman v. Mitchell, 46 Cal. 577; Bjorman
v. Ft. Bragg Redwood Co., 92 Cal. 500, 28 Pac.
591; Garton v. Stern, 121 Cal. 347, 53 Pac. 904;
In re Martin, 113 Cal. 479, 45 Pac. 813; Holtum
v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 139 Cal. 645, 73 Pac.
591. To the same effect is the great weight of
authority. 29 Cyc. 1011, note."
In Clark v. Los Angeles & Sa~t Lake R. Co., 73 Utah
486, 490, 275 P. 582, the defendant appealed from an order denying its motion for a new trial. The Court stated:

'' * * * While on a given state of facts and
circumstances a court may not be justified in withholding a case from the jury, yet, after it is submitted to them and a verdict rendered, if the court
on a motion for a new trial is o.f the opinion that
the jury in rendering the verdict disregarded the
manifest weight of the evidence, or misconceived
it, or disobeyed the charge, or were influenced
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

0

J/aryu

n~v

~nmm

15
through passion or prejudice, the court would not
only be authorized, but it would be its duty, to
grant a new trial.''
Other Utah cases where the general rule has been
recognized and followed are Utah State Nat. Bank v. Livingston et al., 69 Utah 284, 254 P. 781; Hiramatsu v.
Jlarylmul Ins. Co., 73 Utah 303, 273 P. 963; Thompson
et al v. Bozcn Livestock Co. et al., 74 Utah 1, 276 P. 651;
Bro1cn v. Union Pac. R. Oo., 76 Utah 475, 290 P. 759;
Salta.s ~-.Affleck et al., 99 Utah 381, 105 P. 2d 176.
(2)

The rule as established by the Federal Courts.

The defendant in its brief contends that the Federal
rule must be applied because this case comes under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. We have no quarrel
with this contention. We believe ·the Federal rule to be
as broad as the Utah rule, if not broader. Rule 59 of the
New Federal Rules of Procedure, so far as material,
provides:
''(a) Grounds. A new trial may be granted
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of
the issues ( 1) in an action in which there has
been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for
which new trials have heretofore been granted in
actions at law in·the courts of the United States;

•

* * *

'' (d) On Initiative of Court. Not later than
10 days after entry of judgment the court of its
own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial
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on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor.''
This is similar to the rule set forth in Title 28, Sec.
391, U.S.C.A. which was the old rule of the Federal
Courts. That section, so far as material, provides :
"All United States courts shall have power
to grant new trials, in cases where ther·e has been
a trial by jury, for reasons for which new trials
have usually been granted in the courts of law."
The Federal Courts early recogniz·ed the distinction
between the power of a trial court to grant a motion for
a directed verdict and its power to grant a motion for
a new trial.

In Mt. Adams & E. P. Inclined Ry. Co. v. Lowery,
74 F~ed. 463, Circuit Judge Lurton, who afterwards became a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
wrote an opinion in which he was primarily concerned
with the authority of the court to grant a motion for a
directed verdict. He pointed out, however, that the discretionary power of trial courts was much broader on
motions for new trials:

'' * * * Under the repeated rulings of this
court, as well as of the supreme court, it must
be regarded as well settled that upon a writ of
error no question can be raised as to whether
the verdict was against the weight of 'the evidence.
That was a question for the sole determination
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of the trial judge upon the motion for a new trial.
His action in refusing a new trial upon that
ground cannot be a~~igned as error .
.. In X orris Y. Freeman, 3 -\Viis. 39, the Court
said: 'There are rnany cases where the court will
grant new trials notwithstanding there was evidence on both sides, as where all the light has
not been let in at the trial which might and should
have been.' "

This distinction was recognized in Felton v. Spiro,
78 F. 5/G. Circuit Judge Taft pointed out that motions
for new trial are addressed to the discretion of the trial
court, and that such motions afford a remedy to a party
for correction, by the trial court, of injustice done by
verdict, and that new trial is one of the most important
rights of the party defeated by a jury. 8ee Big Brushy
Coal & Coke Co. v. Wil~Va.ms, 176 F. 529; McClellan v.
Pyeatt, 50 F. 686. The Federal rule with regard to this
matter is stated in Camp)beU v. American Foreign 8. 8.
1

Corp., 116 F. (2d) 926, 928, as follows:

'' * * * The granting or refusing of a new trial
is a matter resting within the discretion of the
trial court and will be reviewed only for a clear
abuse of discretion.''
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETIONARY POWER TO
ACT UPON A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IS PART AND
PARCEL OF THE RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY AND THE
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EXERCISE OF SUCH POWER DOES NOT INVADE SUCH
RIGHT.

Defendant in its brief, commencing at page 47, apparently contends that the rule governing ·the exercise
of the trial court's discretionary power to consider and
act upon motions for new trial in cases brought under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act should be the same
as the rule which governs in considering motions for
directed verdict. Defendant further argu·es that unless
it is sustained on this point it will suffer an unwarranted
invasion and abrogation of its right to jury trial. The
cases which defendant ci·tes in this part of its brief relate solely and entirely to the power and authority of
trial courts to grant or deny motions for a directed verdict. The authorities teach us that in England, under
common law, it was recognized that the trial court was
not merely a moderator at a town meeting, but had definite functions and responsibilities, among which was the
duty of preventing miscarriage of justice by granting
new trials in cases where the trial court felt the verdict
to be unjust. It is that rule, unchanged, which has always
and still governs, motions for new trial in F.E.L.A. cases
as it does in all other law aC'tions.
In Capital Trac. Co. v. H of, 174 U. S. 1, 19 S. Ct.
580, 585, 43 L. Ed. 873, the Supreme Couvt considered
what constitut·ed trial by jury, and observed that at common law the facts of a case tried to a jury could be reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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examined on motion for a new trial without invading
thB right of trial by jury:
" 'Trial by jury' in the primary and usual
sense of the term at the comn1on law and in the
American Constitutions, is not merely a trial by
a jury of twelve men before an officer vested
with authority to cause them to be summoned and
impaneled, to administer oaths to them and to the
constable in charge, and to enter judgment and
issue execution on their verdiet; but :it is a trial
by a jury of twelve men, in the presence and
under the superintendence of a judge empowered
to instruct them on the law and to advise them
on the facts, and (except on acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their verdict if in his
opinion it is against the law or the evidence.''
In Patton 'L". Tex. & Fac. Ry. Co., 179 U.S. 658, 660,
21 S. Ct. 275, 276, 45 L. Ed. 361, Mr. Justice Brewer,
after stating that cases are not to he lightly taken from
juries, said:
"At the same time the judge is primarily
responsible for the just outcome of the trial. He
is not a mere moderator of a town meeting, submitting questions to the jury for determination,
nor simply ruling on the admissibility of testimony, but one who in our jurisprudence stands
charged with full responsibility.''
For an ·excellent review of the authorities and statement of the rales prevailing in Federal Courts governing
trial by jury and such right as effected by the discretionary power of the trial judge to set aside verdicts
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and grant new trials, see .lEtna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Y eraUs, 122 F. ( 2d) 350, 352-354, where the Court stated:

''The motion to set aside the verdict and
grant a new trial was a matter of federal procedure, governed by Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and
not subject in any way to rthe rules of state practice. On such a motion it is the duty of the judge
to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, if he
is of opinion that the verdict is against the clear
weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence
which is false, or will result in a miscarriage of
justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict. The exercise of this power is not in derogation of the right of trial by jury but is one of
the historic safeguards of that right. Smith v.
Tim·es Pub. Co., 178 Pa. 481, 36 A. 296, 35 L.R.A.
819; Bright v. Eynon. 1 Burr. 390; Mellin v. Taylor, 3 B.N.C. 109, 132 Eng. Reports 351. The matter was well put by Mr. Justice Mitchell, speaking for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Smith v. Times Publishing Co., supra (178 Pa.
481, 36 A. 298), as follows: 'The authority of the
common pleas in the control and revision of excessive verdicts through the means of new trials
was firmly settled in England before the foundation of this colony, and has always existed here
without challenge under any of our constrtutions.
It is a power to examine the whole case on the
law and the evidence, with a view to securing a
result, not merely legal, but also not manifestly
against justice,-a power exercised in pursuance
of a sound judicial discretion, without which the
jury system would be a capricious and intolerable tyranny, which no people could long endure.
This court has had occasion more than once re1
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cently to say that it was a power tlzc oovztrts ought

to exercise unflinchingly.'
"In the smne rase, ~r r. Justice Williams, in a
concurring opinion, traces the history of the exercise of this power and sums up his conclusion as
follows:
" ·Trial by jury' therefore meant, at the time
of ~Iagna Charta, the investigation and decision
of an issue of fact between parties litigant by 12
men, sitting as jurors, under the advice and legal
direction of a law judge. \Vben the verdict is rendered by the jury, it is to the court of which they
are a part. It is recorded upon the minutes of the
court, and becomes a part of the record of the
trial; but it does not thereby become a judgment
of the court, unless the judge is satisfied with it,
and specially or by general order or rule so directs. He has a responsibility for the result no
less than the jury, for it is his duty to see ~that
right and justice are done, so far as this may be
practicable in the particular case. If he is not
satisfied with the verdict, it is his duty to set it
aside, and grant a new trial before another jury.
This was the settled practice in England as early
as 1665. Forsyth, Jury Tr. 164. Lord Holt S'tates
tha:t the practice of granting new trials, as a means
of correcting the mistakes and relieving against
the misconduct of juries, was in use much earlier
than 1665, but accounts for its exercise not appearing in the books for the reason that, prior to
that date, the action of the courts upon motions
was not reported.

* * * *
'' 'As early, therefore, as 1665, the courts at
Westminster did precisely what we have done in
this case, and for the same reason. The right of
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trial by jury was not then supposed to give to a
successful party the right to insist on an advantage due to the mistake or the willful misconduct
of the jury, no matter how grossly unjust and
oppressiv·e the result might be; but the supervisory control of the court in bane, sitting as a
court of review, was promptly exercised to relieve against the miscarriage of justice. The exercise of this power was then thought to be in aid
of trial by jury. Lord Mansfield, in Bright v.
Eynon, 1 Burrows, 390, described the effect of thus
granting a new trial as 'no more than having the
cause more deliberately considered by another
jury, when there is reasonable doubt, or perhaps
a certainty, that justice has not been done.' The
function of the jury was well defined by Chief
Justice Holt in Ash v. Ash, Holt, 701, nearly 100
years before the Declaration of Independence:
'The jury are to try the cause with the assistance
of the judge.' They are not, and have never been,
independent of the court of which they are a part,
but 'their verdicts must m·eet the approval, or at
least they must not offend the sense of justice,
of the presiding judge, who, as the late Justice
Grier, of the supreme court of the United States,
was fond of saying, was by virtue of his position
'the thirteenth juror.' '
"In 1757, Lord Mansfield in Bright v. Eynon,
supra, had this to say with respect to the exercise
of the power :
'' 'Trials by jury in civil causes, could not
subsist now without a power, somewhere, to grant
new trials. * * * There are numberless causes of
false verdicts, without corruption or bad in'tention
of the jurors. They may have heard too much
of the matter before the trial; and imbibed prejudices without knowing it. The cause may he
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intricate: the examination n1ay be so long as to
distract and confolmd their attention. l\Iost general verdicts include legal consequences as well as
propositions of fact: in drawing these consequences the jury Inay mistake, and infer directly
contrary to law. The parties may be surprised by
a case falsely n1ade at the trial, which they had no
reason to expect, and therefore could not come
prepared to answer. If unjust verdicts obtained
under these and a thousand like circumstances,
were to be conclusive for ever, the determination
of civil property, in this method of trial, would be
very precarious and unsatisfactory. It is absolutely necessary to justice, that there should, upon
many occasions, be opportunities of reconsidering the cause by a new trial.'
"In l\fellin v. Taylor, supra, Chief Justice
Tindal said: 'I cannot conceive how the benefit
of trial by jury can be in any way impaired by a
cautious and prudent application of the corrective
which is now applied for: on the con'trary, I think
that, without some power of this nature residing
in the breast of the Court, the trial by jury would,
in particular cases, be productive ·of injustice, and
the institution itself would suffer in the opinion
of the public.' ''
See Kaufman v. AtM!ntic Greyhound Corp., 41 F.
Supp. 252 (Dist. Ct. W. Va.) wherein a trial court granted a motion for a new trial, citing as authority the ZEtna
Casu.a~f}y case, supra.
From the foregoing authorities it clearly appears
that so far as the Federal Courts ar,e concerned the exercise of the discretionary power vested in trial courts
to consider and act upon motions for new trial cannot
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be regarded as an invasion of the right of trial by jury,
but on the contrary is part and parcel of such right.
In the case here the trial court considered the motion
for new trial and exercised his discretionary power by
vacating the judgment bas·ed on the jury's verdict and
granting a new trial and the case was tried to another
jury.
The defendant assigned no error pertaining to the
second trial nor does it complain of the siz.e of the verdict. ($75,000.00 reduced to $50,000.00 by the trial judge).
The result of the second trial and the defendant's reaction to it would certainly indicate that a miscarriage
of justice occurred in the first trial and that the trial
judge properly exercised a sound discretion in granting
plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
We have been unable to find any authority which indicates the existence of a rule peculiar to Federal Employers' Liability Act cases and defendant has cited none.
Certainly there is no reason or justification for a rule
differing from the general rule applicable peculiarly to
cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. On the other hand, there are numerous cases arising under the F.E.L.A. where the exercise of the discretionary power of the trial courts in granting or refusing new trials has been assigned as error and reviewed
by appellate courts. In all of these instances the general
rule has been applied. Perritn v. Union Rae. R. Co., 59
Utah 1, 201 P. 405, and Klinge v. S.outhe.r.n Rae. Co.,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~ .•

•.

25
89 Utah ~S-t. 57 P. (~d) :iGi, 37-±. are cases in point. In
the latter case this Court declared:

'' * * * The rule is well established that a
presumption exists that a trial court did not err
or abuse his discretion in granting or refusing a
new trial, and that the burden is upon him complaining of the ruling to show a clear abuse of
discretion. Utah State Nat. Bank v. Livingston,
69 e tah. 28-±, 25-! P. 781 ; Thomas v. Ogden Rapid
Transit Co., 47 Utah, 595, 155 P. 436; Hirabelli
v. Daniels, 44 Utah, 88, 138 P. 1172; White v.
Union Pac. R. Co., 8 Utah, 56, 29 P. 1030; Alt
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 5 S. D. 20, 57 N. W.
1126, 1128; Koch v. Imhof, 315 Pa. 145, 172 A.
672, 673; 0 'Barr v. Pioneer Life Ins. Co., 172 S.C.
72, 172 S.E. 769; 4 C.J. 798. In the cas·e of Alt v.
Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., supra, that court, in a personal injury case, stated that: 'It requires a court
as well as a jury to try causes of this nature, and,
while the jury is the judge of the facts viewed in
the light of the law, as a rule no verdict should
stand when, in the sound judgment 'Of the trial
court, it operates as a wrong between the parties
which might be remedied upon a retrial.' ''
In Cheffey v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 79 F. Supp. 252
(Dist. Ct. Pa. 1948), an action arising under the Federal
Employers' LiabHity Act, a F·ederal District Court
granted a motion for new trial in reliance upon JEtna
CaSUialty & Surety Comparny v. YeaUs, 122 F. (2d) 350,
heretofore cited in this brief.
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POINT III.
WHERE THERE IS CONFLICTING EVIDENCE ON THE
QUESTION OF LIABILITY THE GRANTING OF A MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL BY THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AS MATTER OF LAW.

( 1) The rule as adopted and followed by
Supreme Court of Ut,ah.

th~

We respectfully submit that the weight of the evidence on the matter of liability was strongly in favor
of plaintiff here, and tha:t the verdict ''No Cause of
Action'' constituted a grav,e miscarriage of justice. However, on this appeal it is not necessary ror plaintiff to
establish or show that the weight of evidence was in his
favor or that the verdict constituted a miscarriage of
justice.
Under the decisions of this Court the order of a trial
court granting a motion for new trial will be sustained
on appeal if it appears that there was a conflict in the
evidence upon the material issues of liability. Where
the evidence is conflicting and the trial court, in the
exercise of its discretionary power, grants a new trial,
there can be no abuse of discretion as matter of law.
This was clearly stated in the case of Utah 8tlate Nat.

Bank v. Livingston et ~al., 69 Utah 284, 286, 254 P. 781.
The action in that case was tried twice in the District
Court. In the first trial a verdict was returned in favor
of defendants and upon plaintiff's motion for a new trial
grounded upon insufficiency of evidence the verdict was
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set aside and a new trial granted. The defendant assigned the act of the trial court as error. This Court stated:
'' ..:-\.ppellants complain that the action of the
trial court in setting aside the verdict in favor of
defendants and granting a new trial was an abuse
of discretion and error, for which the judgment
apealed from should be reversed and judgment
ordered entered upon the first verdict. Such a
claim was sustained in Hirabelli v. Daniels, 44
Ptah, 88, 138 P. 1172, but upon a record and state
of facts quite dissimilar from the case at bar.
The granting of a new trial rests so largely in
the discretion of the trial court that its action in
that regard will not be disturbed unless there is
a clear abuse of discretion. ·vali otis v. Utah Apex
~lining Co., 55 Utah, 151, 184 P. 802. The evidence
at the first trial of the instant case was very
similar in its general aspects to the evidence at
the second trial presently to be considered. Without reviewing the evidence taken at the first trial
it is sufficient in this connection to state that upon
the essential matter in dispute the evidence was
substantially conflicting. As was said in the cas·e
last. above cited:
'' 'In such .a case this court must hold as a
matter of ~aw that no ·abuse of discretion is
shown.'
·
''The contention that the tria.l count, abused
its discretion by gnanti.ng a new trial is therefore
denied.''
Defendant has never contended that there was not
ample and sufficient evidence to support plaintiff's
charges of neglect. On the authority of the above case
there was no abuse of discretion her·e as matter of law.
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(2) The rule .as adopted and tonowed by the Federal Court.s.

The rule is firmly established in the Federal Courts
that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by granting a new trial for insufficiency of the evidence where
there is a conflict in the evidence or where there is any
evidence that would support a verdict in favor of the
moving party.

In General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Oorp. v.
Dickinso.n, 61 F. Supp. 153, 156, a District Judge granted
plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The Court reviewed
the evidence and granted the motion in reliance upon
statements of the rule contained in a number of California cases. We quote:
'' 'A motion for new trial on the ground that
the verdi~t is not sustained by the evidence is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court.' 1Etna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Reliable
Auto Tire Co., 8 Cir., 58 F. 2d 100, 104; and in
respe~t to sufficiency of the evidence on disputed
matters of fact 'is addressed to him as the thirteenth juror.' McBride v. Neal, 7 Cir., 214 F. 966,
968.''
The Court then quotes from the California case of
Green v. Soule, 145 Cal. 96, 102, 78 P. 337, 340, as follows:
''This view has been repeatedly reiterated by
the Supreme Court and the Distric;t Courts of
Appeal of the State of California. The Supreme
Court recently stated in Re Green's Estate, 154 P.
2d 692, that a trial court does not abuse its disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cretion in granting· a new trial for insufficiency
of evidence where there is a conflict in the evidence or where there is any evidence which would
support a judgment in favor of the moving
party."
And the Court finally quotes from Grover v. Sharp,
another California case, reported at 153 P. (2d) 83, 84,
as follows:

" '* * * It is thoroughly settled in California
that a trial judge in passing on a motion for a
new trial is not bound by conflicts in the evidence;
that in fact he sits as a thirteenth juror with the
duty resting on him of revi·ewing the evidence
and passing on its sufficiency; that if he is dissatisfied with the verdict and concludes that it
has resulted in a miscarriage of justice it becomes
his duty to grant the motion.' This Court, so sitting as a thirteenth juror, has reviewed the evidence, is dissatisfied with the verdicts and concluded that they have resulted in .a miscarriage
of justice.''
In Clement v. Wilson, 135 Fed. 749, the Oourt stated:
''This is a writ of error by the defendant in
the court below brought to review an order setting
aside a verdict in favor of the defendant and directing a new trial. The verdict was set aside because the court was of the opinion that it had not
been rendered by an impartial jury. There are
two reasons why-this writ of error cannot be entertained: (1) It has long been the established
law in the courts of the United States that to
grant or refus·e a ne·w trial rests in the sound discretion of the court to which the motion is adSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dressed, and the r~esult cannot be made the subof a review upon a writ of error. Newcomb
v. Wood, 97 U. S. 581, 24 L. Ed. 1085; Nudd v.
Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 23 L. Ed. 286; Railroad
Co. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291, 23 L. Ed. 898. ''
je~t

An interesting application of this rule is found in
the language of the court in the case of Baltimore & 0.
R. Co. v. Baunders, 159 F. (2d) 481, 485. A verdict was
rendered for plaintiff and defendant appeals, one of its
contentions being that the case was not properly submitted to the jury. The Court states:

'' * * * Counsel for appellant do not press
the motion for directed verdict on appeal, but
argue that the ~erdict should not be allowed to
stand because contrary to the weight of the evidence. This, however, is a matter resting in the
discretion of the trial court. Only where verdict
should have been directed, because the evidence
was all one way or so clearly so that reasonable
men coiUld .not have differed as to the facts, do we
have jurisd,iction to review the 1t:rial oo!Urt 's action,
and this on the theory that the question then becomes one of Zaw . .LEtna Casualty & Surety Co.
v. Yeatts, 4 Cir., 122 F. 2d 350, 352-3'54."
As we construe the last s·en'tence of the above quotation and applying it to the case at bar, under the Federal rule the trial court's act in granting a motion for
a new trial can only be reversed wher.e the question becomes one of law.
Defendant, in the case at bar, cannot prevail on the
error assigned her;e unless it is made to appear that the
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evidence introduced at the trial of this case was such
that it would have been entitled to a directed verdict in
its favor. D€fendant has never so contended.
(3)

The rule u·nder California decisi·ons.

In Ball.ard

Pacific Greyhound Lines, 170 P. (2d)
-:1:65, -:1:67, the Supreme Oourt of California stated:
L

'· * * * All presumptions are in favor of the
order and it will be affirmed if it is sustainabl~e
on any ground. ~Iazzotta v. Los Angeles R. Corp.,
25 Cal. 2d 165, 169, 153 P. 2d 338, and cases cited.
The trial court in considering a motion for new
trial is not bound by a conflict in the evidence, and
has not abused its discretion when there is any
evidence which would support a judgment in favor
of the moving party. In re Estate of Green, 25
Cal. 2d 535, 542, 154 P. 2d 692 ; Hames v. Rust,
14 Cal. 2d 119, 124, 92 P. 2d 1010. The only conflict may be the opposing inferences deducible
from uncontradicted probative facts. In such
case the trial court may draw inferences oppos·ed
to those accepted by the jury and may thus resolve
the conflicting inferences in favor of the moving
party, for 'It is only wher·e it can be said as a
matter of law that there is no substantial evidence
to support a contrary judgment that an appellate
court will revers·e the order of the trial court.' ''
In McCoy v. Yellow Cab Co. of Califorwia, 198 P.
(2d) 371, 377, the Court stated:
''The motion for new trial was granted as to
the respondents Furlong on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict
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against them. An examination of the record as
to their participation in the collision, briefly
shown in the foregoing resume, discloses evidence
to the effect that the Furlong car was half way
through the intersection when the Yellow cab
reached the westerly curb line of Beechwood as it
entered the intersection. Since this would tend
to support a verdict in favor of the respondents
Furlong, the order granting a new trial will not
be disturbed. Ballard v. Pacific Greyhound Lines,
supra.''
In the case of Potts v. Laos, (Wash.) 200 P. (2d)
505, 508, the Court stated:
''Where the order granting a motion for a
new trial is general and does not specify the
ground or grounds upon which it was based, the
inquiry of this court is limHed to the determination of the ques'tion whether the evidence was sufficient to take the case to the jury. * * *
"In such oase, wnless we oan say that the verdict ·Of the jury was, as a matter of law, the ·only
verdict that covuld be rendered, the orde.r gr:arntimg
the new trial must be affirmed. Henry v. Larsen,

sw?pro.

* * * *
''The trial courts have wide discretion in
granting or refusing to grant new trials, and the
exercise of this discretion in granting a new trial
will not be interf,ered with except in situations
where only questions of law are involved. Corhaley v. Pierce County, 192 Wash. 688, 74 P. 2d
993; ·* * *
''Wher-e the evidence upon a material issue
in a case is conflicting, but sufficient to take the
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case to the jury, and there are no purely legal
questions involved, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to grant or deny a motion
for new trial, and the ruling of the court on such
motion will not be interfered with unless it is
clear, from the record, that the court has abused
its discretion. ~\hrens v. Anderson, supra, and
cases therein cited.
"A much stronger shou·ing of abuse of discretion will ordinarily be required to set ,aside ,an
order gtranting a new trial than one denying a
new trial. Ahrens v. Anderson, supra, and cases
therein cited.'',.

In the case of Burke Greis Co. v. Ballard, (Okla.)
193 P. (2d) 582, 585, the Court stated:
" 'It is not incumbent upon a trial court to
render a judgment in accordance with every verdict of a jury. The trial court performs an essentially solemn function in the furtherance of justice. It must not be forgotten that it is an unyielding and obligatory duty of the trial court to car,efully weigh the entire judicial proceedings, which
have occurred throughout the trial, and, unless
the verdict of the jury meets the responsive and
affirmative approval and conscience of the court,
it should not stand, and the same should be set
aside and a new trial granted.'

'' ~The Supreme Court will not trevers~e the
ruling of the trial court grant'ing a new trial unless
it can be seen beyond all reasonable doubt that t:he
trial court has manifestly arnd mater ially erred
wi.th respect to some pure, simple, and ~unmixed
questions of law, and that excBpt fo.r such error
1
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the ruling of the trial cowrt would, not have been
s:o made. The Supreme Court will very seldom
and very reluctantly reverse the decision or order
of the trial court which gronts a new trial.' "

In Stone v. Los Angeles County Flood Contro·l Dist.,
(Cal.) 185 P. ( 2d) 396, 398, the Court stated:
''If the evide(Jit(;e is uncontr,a~t1ed a trial
judge may nevertheless draw inferences from it
opposed to those drawn by the jury and it is only
when, as a matter of Zaw, there is no substantVal
evidenoe to· support a judgment cont{f'ary to the
verd,iCJt of the jury that an app·eUate court will
reverse the order granting a new trial. Brooks
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 2d 305, 307,
163 P. 2d 689; Williams v. Field Transportation
Co., 28 Cal. 2d 696, 698, 171 P. 2d 722.''

In the case of MacEenzie v. Angle, (Cal.) 186 P.
( 2d) 30, 32, the Court stated :

'' * * * In the latter cas·e the court said that
where there appears to be reasonable or even fairly debatable justification therefor, an order granting a new trial will not be set aside although a
contrary order might not be disapproved or the
appellate court might be inclined to take a different view."
(B) THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED SOUND
AND JU8T DISCRETION IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW T'RIAL.
In this phase of respondent's brief it will be our purpose to make a careful review of the evidence to reve·al
to this Court:
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(a) That the jury's verdict of No Cause of Action
resulted in a graYe miscarriage of justice; and
(b) That plaintiff':;; charges of negligence were
supported by the great weight of evidence; and
(c) That the jury's verdict was contrary to the evidence and undisputed facts.
For the convenienee of the Court we have attached
to this brief a map, prepared by a Civil Engineer, taken
from the Timetable introduced in this case as Exhibit
'' 3' '. This map shows the location of the various stations, sidings and spurs on the Goshen Branch and o'ther
pertinent information with reference to mileage, all as
revealed by the evidence and the exhibits in this case.
This action was brought under the provisions of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A., Sections
51 et seq., which provides, as far as material here, as
follows:
''Sec. 51. Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of
the several states * * * shall he liabl~e in damages
:~~: * * in case of the death of such employee, to his
personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow * * * and children of such employee;
* * * for * * * death resulting in whole or in part
from the negligence of any of the officers, agents,
or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any
defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in
its * * * track, roadbed, * * * or other equipment.''
"Sec. 53. In all actions hereafter brought
against any such common carrier by railroad unSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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der or by virtue of any of the provisions of this
chapter to recover damages for personal injuries
to an employe•e, ·or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact that the employee may
have been guilty of contributory negligence shall
not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount
of negligence attributable to such employee: * * *"
In submitting the cause to the jury, the Court in its
Instruction No. 1 (R. 103) set forth the issues on liability
as follows:
'' 1. In that it failed to furnish said decedent
a reasonably safe place to work when it required
him to perform the duties of his employment from
the platform of the caboose as said caboose was
being shoved along over the railroad tracks of the
defendant immediately prior to and at the time of
the occurrence of said accident.

'' 2. In that def·endant failed to furnish, install and maintain an adequate, secure and proper
safety chain and hook across the opening to the
rear of the platform of the caboose where de0edent
was stationed and working, at and immediately
prior to the occurrence of said accident.
'' 3. In that defendant used an unsa£e method
and practice in making up its train and moving
it over said Goshen Branch Line in this, in that it
caused the boxcar then and there being used as a
caboose to be coupled to the pilot ·end of the engine
and shoved along ahead of the train thereby subjecting said decedent to unnecessary hazards.
'' 4. That defendant failoed to furnish decedent with a safe place to perform the labors and
duties incident to his employment, in that it reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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quired hin1 to work upon a platform located on
the leading end of UP car No. 05706. That due
to the size. weight, and construction of said car it
had a tendency to, and did sway from side to side
and pitch up and down when being shoved along
said railroad tracks, and that as a result of that
condition decedent's place of work was hazardous
in that his footing on said platform became and
was insecure and unstable as said car was being
shoved along the tracks approaching the point
where said accident occurred.''
By its verdict of No Cause of Action the jury absolved the defendant of all negligence and placed the full
responsibilit:~ for the fatal accident upon the deceased.
In granting plaintiff's motion for new trial, the Court
declared (R. 179) :
''The motion for a new trial in the aboveentitled action having heretofore been made by the
above-named plaintiff and submitted to the Court
after arguments thereon, both oral and written,
and the Court being fully advised in the premis·es,
said motion for new trial is hereby granted.
''The Jury by its verdict absolved the defendant of all negligence which was a proximate
caus·e of the injuries to and death of the decedent.
It did this despite the uncontroverted evidence
(1) that the caboose from which the decedent fell
was being propelled ahead of the locomotive and
of the train, thereby rendering such an accident
as caused the death of the deceased possible; and
(2) that the safety chain mentioned in the evidence was inadequate, at least that when it was
put to the test it failed to perform the function
for which it was intended.
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''The motion for new trial therefore is granted primarily on the grounds stated in Paragraph
8 of plaintiff's Notice of Intention to move for a
New Trial, and also upon the general grounds set
forth in Section 104-40-7 Utah Code Annotated,
1943. There was no doubt a misapprehension, or a
disregard, on the part of the Jury either of the
evidence, or of the Court's instructions, or of
both."

The evidence will be discussed und,er several pertinent sub-headings.
(1) DEFENDANT MADE UP ITS TRAIN WITH THE
CABOOSE AHEAD OF THE ENGINE WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OR MEANS OF KN.OWLEDGE THAT IN SO DOING
IT THEREBY SUBJECTED ITS BRAKEMEN TO UNUSUAL
AND UNNECESSARY DANGER AND HAZARD.

Defendant placed the caboose upon which deceased
was working at the time of his death ahead of the engine,
knowing that its brakemen would be required to perform
their duties upon the platform of the caboose as it was
being sho¥ed along in front of the train over the Goshen
Branch line track.
The train was made up by the defendant with the
caboose at the head of the train under the direction and
with the approval of Conduetor Freeman.
When the crew came to work on the morning of the
28th of October, 1947, the train, already made up, was
in readiness. The crew brought the ,engine out of the
roundhouse and coupled it onto the train (R. 327). The
caboose at that time was coupled to the rear of the train
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(R. 329). When the crew returned from midday lunch
the train to be taken out was made up and ready for
departure. The rear sixteen cars were loaded with beets,
ahead of the loads were ten empty coal cars ; the engine
was coupled on ahead of the empties, and the caboose
under the direction of Freeman, the Conductor, was. coupled onto the front or pilot end of the engine (R. 334).
Freeman testified (R. 665) that as conductor he was
in charge of the train crew and was responsible for the
operation of the train; that he directed the train's movement and the work and activities of the t)rain crew. At
R. 679 he stated that he wanted the caboose placed ahead
of the engine and that whether it was placed ahead
of the engine or at the rear of the train was a matter
entirely within his discretion; and at R. 708-9-10 that if
he had desired to place the caboos.e at the rear end of
the train he would have done so.
Croft, who was working with Jorgensen at the time
of his death, testified that he had worked on the Goshen
Braneh beet job during fifteen seasons and that the defendant customarily shoved the caboose ahead of the
engine (R. 325, 326). .At R. 334 he testified that the yard
force in making up the trains always asked whoever was
in charge of the train where they wanted the caboose
and that this was done in making up the train which the
crew took out on the afternoon of the fatal event.
He testified that the proper way to make up a train
was to place the caboose at the rear (R. 460).
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Fenton Wilson, a switchman of six years experience
in the Idaho Falls yard, testified that it was part of his
duties to make up trains in the yard and that the c:aboose
should be at the rear of the train (R. 511), and that
switchmen making up trains in the yards customarily
placed the caboose at the rear unless otherwise ordered
(R. 512).
Croft t·estified that in his opinion the train was not
made up properly on the day of the fatal accident because ''it could have be·en made up the way it should
have been made up with the caboose at the rear" (R.
387).
Freeman, Conductor, testified-that in his experience
as a conductor it had been the custom and was the safest
to have the caboose at the rear of the train (R. 677).
At R. 387, Croft testified:

'' Q.

A.

There nev·er is a time when it is proper to
have the c:aboose at the head of the engine,
is that what you want to say~
Yes sir."

J. E. Brown, a qualified expert, testified as follows
(R. 573).
'' Q. When do you place a caboose in head of a
train~
wo~k

A.

Only in

train service.

Q.

Only in work train

A.

That is all.

service~
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Q. In your twenty-se,·en years of experience, did
you eYer know of a caboose to be used continuously ahead of the train~
~-\... N" o sir."
We submit that a brakeman required to perform his
duties while stationed upon the front platform of a
caboose being propelled along at the head of a moving
train is thereby subjected to dangers and hazards far
greater than if his place of work (the caboose platform)
were on a caboose attached to the rear of the train. The
mere statement of this fact should supply its own proof.
It seems apparent that if a brakeman fell or was jerked
off a moving train while stationed on the platform of a
trailing caboose, there would be a much greater likelihood of survival, than if he were jerked or fell forward
from the platform of a caboose being shoved along ahead
of the train. The latter event would most certainly result in fatal injuries as it did here. However there was
evidence on this point.
Croft testified that requiring a brakeman to ride on
the front end of a caboose as it was being shoved along
the line was more hazardous to a man than dropping
cars (R. 469).
Brown stated that in his opinion brakemen required
to perform their duties on the platform of a caboose
being shoved along ahead of a train might fall or be
jerked off by any sudden stop, jerk or train sway and
that it would be more dangerous to fall from the front
of a caboose being shoved ahead of the train than to
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fall from the platform of a trailing caboose (R. 564),
for the reason that a fall from a trailing caboose might
result in injury, but a fall from the platform of a caboose
being shoved ahead would most certainly result in death,
( R. 566-67) .
(2) THERE WAS NO NECESSITY OR REASON FOR
PLACING THE CABOOSE AHEAD OF THE TRAIN AND IN
MAKING UP AND OPERATING ITS TRAIN, AS IT DID,
DEFENDANT VIOLATED ITS OWN OPERATING RULE
802 (J).

Rule 802 ( J) ( R. 355) provided :
''Cars must not he handled ahead of engine
between stations, except when necessary to take
cars to or from a spur or in work train service
and the movement then must be for no greater
distance than necessary.''
The evidence clearly reveals that the train, upon
which Jorgensen was working when killed, was improperly made up; that there was no necessity for placing the
caboose at the front of the train thus requiring Jorgensen
to perform his duties while statinned on the platform
at the leading ·end of the caboose; and that in so doing
defendant violated its Operating Rule 802 (J).
The train upon which Jorgensen was working when
killed had been made up by the yard switchmen according to the desir·es of the conductor. There was no switching to do at any station after delivering the sixteen loads
of beets at Orvin and Lincoln Junction (R. 336).
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Croft testified that the ten en1pty cars coupled to
the rear of the engine were all to be set out at Indian
and that they had no orders for any work beyond Indian,
that there were no loads to pick up. He had seen the
orders referred to (R. 333). The siding at Indian was
clear that day and after the empties were set out at
Indian the train and crew were to return to the factory
(R. 336).
Prior to the occurrence of the fatal accident the
caboose had been shoved along ahead of the train from
Idaho Falls to Orvin, from there to Lincoln Junction,
from Lincoln Junction to Wilkinson, and from Wilkinson
to Ammon, and from Ammon to the point where Jorgensen was killed (R. 355-56). See map attached hereto.
He testified that even though there had been cars
to pick up beyond Indian it would not be necessary or
helpful to have the caboose ahead of the engine. After
a hammering cross examination he again reiterated that
there were no cars at Cox that afternoon, and stated
that even so, the caboose should have been at the rear
of the train and that the necessity of picking up cars at
Cox, if such existed, could not have been expedited in
any way by handling the caboose ahead of the train.
At R. 467 and 469 Croft testified definitely that if
the caboose had been at the rear of the train no extra
switching movements whatsoever would have become necessary.
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He testified that there was no necessity of having
the caboose in front of the engine on the afternoon job on
the day Jorgensen was killed (R. 3'54).
Croft also testified at R. 378-79-80-81, that he did
not figure they were in work train service that afternoon
and that "we weren't doing a regular service a work
train would be doing, and we were handling commercial
stuff," and at (R. 356) :
On this afternoon job that you were performing when Jorgensen was killed, were you moving any cars at all between spurs 1
A. No, not this day.
Q. On this day was the train that you were
handling a train in work train service~
A. No, we wer,en't doing work train work. We
were working with working orders, but not
doing work train work."

'' Q.

At R. 470 he testified that the only work the train
crew did on this Branch line was to take out empty cars
from Idaho Falls and place them on the spurs and sidings
as r,equired and take loaded cars off the spurs and sidings
and haul them into the yards at Idaho Falls on the return
trip.
Freeman testified that there was no switching operation to be performed by the train crew between Lincoln
Junction and Indian. His testimony is int,eresting, and
we quote (R. 679):
'' Q.

Now, on this trip from Indian-or from Lincoln Junction to Indian on which the accident
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occurred, there was no switching operation,
was there'?
A.

None this day, no.

Q. State whether or not there was any need, for
the switching operations, to have the caboose
on the front of the engine~
A. I wanted it there.
Q. "\Yell, yes, and it's discretional with you, as
I understand it~
A.

It is.

Q. I believe you indicated that on occasions you
had it in front of the engine so that it would
expedite switching operations~,
A.

That's right.

Q. But in this instance, just prior to the accident, there was no switching operation necessary between Lincoln Junction and Indian,
was there~
A.

No."

.And further (R. 703):

'' Q. Did I understand you to say that there was
nothing wrong with the caboose being in
front of the engine, for switching purposes 1
A.

The~e

was nothing wrong with it being there.

Q. For switching purposes1
A.

Yes. That's what I had it there for.
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Q. And is th~t the o~ly reason you had it th~ref
A. That's one reason, yes.
Q. Well, isn't that the only reason f
A.

Yes sir.

Q. The tracks where you were operating this day
were such that the caboose could have been
placed on the rear of the train; isn't that
true?
A.

Could have been."

(R. 706):

"Q. Mr. Freeman, you indicated that having the
caboose on the front end of the engine assisted in dropping cars; that's true, isn't iU
A.

Don't assist in dropping them, but it's in the
proper place when they are on the head end.

Q. Now, there were no cars to be dropped between Lincoln Junction and Indian, were
there~

A.

No cars to be dropped at that-No, not that
I knew of.

Q.

That's right. So that it didn't-having the
caboose on the front end didn't assist you in
your proper operation of your train, and
switching movements, between Lincoln Junction and Indian~

* * *
Q.

State whether or not it gave you any assistance, between those two points, in having it
on the front~

A.

I will say no."
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(R. 673) Freeman testified:

"'Q.

A.

Your next movement was to go down to
Indian1
Yes sir.
* * •

Q. There was no switching to be done between
Lincoln and Indian 1
A.

No, didn't anticipate any.''

It thus clearly appears that when the train left Idaho
Falls the crew knew that there were no cars to be placed
on any of the spurs, and if there had been cars to place
on these spurs it would have been necessary to drop
them in because all of the cars were behind the engine.
The conclusion is irresistible that no switching movement was expedited, aided, assisted or made less difficult
by having the caboose ahead of the engine, and therefore
in making up the train the defendant violated its own
Rule 802 (J), subjected Jorgensen to unnecessary hazards, which materially and substantially contributed to
the cause of his death.
THE DEFENDANT'S DEFENSE AGAINST ITS VIOLATION OF ITS OWN OPERATING RULE 802 (J).

This rule provides (1) ''Cars must not be handled
ahead of engine between stations", with the following
exceptions (a) except when necessary to take cars to or
from a spur. No contention was made in this case that
there existed any necessity whatsoever of taking cars to
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or from a spur or from spur to spur. When the train left
Idaho Falls it had no cars in it which were to be placed
on any spur, nor were there any cars to remove from
any of the three spur tracks; (b) ''or in work train service'' with the following limitation ''and the movement
then must be for no greater distance than necessary."
The caboose was intentionally placed at the forefront of
the train, and there was no reason or necessity for so
placing it. The railroad contends that Jorgensen's train
was a work train and that it was in work train service,
and by ignoring the limitation ("and the movement then
must be for no greater distance than necessary''), seeks
to justify violation of Rule 802 ( J).
Most of the record made by the defendant was in
its attempt to build up two "strawmen". Defendant, to
justify its violation of the rule attempted to show (1}
that shoving the caboose ahead of the car was less dangerous than a drop and that it was so placed to save a
drop, but the record is clear as herein set forth, that
no drop was saved nor eliminated on this day inasmuch
as all of the cars brought out of Idaho Falls were behind
the engine. Therefore placing the caboose at the head of
the train could not and as matter of fact did not save or
eliminate a drop.
Disregarding for the moment the limitation of the
right to move cars ahead of the engine "in work train
service'' i.e., ''the movement then must be for no greater
distance than necessary", let us examine the evidence
as to whether or not this was a work train.
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In some instances railroad counsel referred to the
train as ·'a roving s"itch engine'' and other instances
as "a work train." It was neither. It was a branch line
train which handled nothing but commercial freight, and
in so doing, delivered empties to be loaded with such
freight, and performed necessary switching operations
at the various sidings and spurs.
Defendant at page 3 of its brief describes the operation of this train in language which we adopt as being
fair and accurate.

'' * * * Operations on this line are seasonal
and involve the setting out of empty cars at the
above named stations and picking them up and
returning them to Idaho Falls or Lincoln when
they are loaded. The traffic is principally in
beets, some pot a toes, and pumice stone which is
picked up at one station, Indian, and the operation is referred to as the Lincoln beet job. The
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company maintains a factory
at Lincoln. The job was set up September 22,
1947 and traffic such as indicat,ed above was handled until January 10, 1948, at which time the
service was discontinued. It is a daily operation,
including Sundays, once it starts and the deceased
had worked every day from the time the job was
set up, September 22, 1947, until the day of the
accident.''
Defendant seemed to contend that the orders under
which the train operated made of it a train ''in work
train service." Although these orders were in the possession of the defendant and could have been produced
for examination by the Court and jury, it did not see fit
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to exhibit them. The only testimony on that is certain
illusory suggestions contained in the testimony of Freeman.
Croft testified that when he bid the job in it was
billed on the Bulletin with an ordinary tie-up at Idaho
Falls, that there was nothing on the Bulletin to indicate
that the train was a work train; that it was not bulletined as a work train or an extra, hut as a "beet train,"
( R. 466-67).
Brown testified with reference to the distinction between work trains and work train service (R. 572, 573)
as follows:

''Q.
A.

Q.

What is a work

train~

Well, it is according to how your train orders
are issued to you.

0

Just describe a work train, so a jury might
visualize it.

II!~

A. A work train is a train assigned to gather
company material, or to do other company
work.

m~~

Q.

What kind of

A.

Such as laying rails, unloading ties, spreading of ballast, or what we call 'ditching with
a clam shovel' or 'ditcher', a ~egular ditcher,
or scoop di tcher.
Did you ever know of a work train being assigned to do regular switching operations in
stations up and down a line~

Q.
A.

work~

No, sir, I have never been on one."
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And at R. 573, 57-!, as follows:

•' Q. You have heard of work trains, and you have
also heard of work train service, haven't you~
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And you have heard of trains operating
lmder work train service orders, haven't you~
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And you have heard of trains operating under those orders where they were not doing
company work, haven't you~
A.

\Yell, no.

Q. Never
A.

have~

They don't give you that kind of a train
order."

Baker, the defendant's Trainmaster, on cross examination, testified that local trains usually handle commercialloads and that to his individual knowledge there
was nothing handled on the Goshen Branch except commercial loads of beets, potatoes and pumice stone. In
answer to the question :

'' Q. What other work did that train ever do or
perform except the work necessarily incident
to handling that freight on the Goshen
Branch~

* * *
A.

They would have to do what is called work at
Lincoln Junction and that would he incidental
work at the factory, spotting coal and spotting for beets." (R. 782)
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That the only right of way maintenance work they could
ever do would be to perhaps deliver gravel or cinders
where needed. He testified (R. 783):

'' Q. Do they have any other work to do except
move empties, and except, of course, to move
loads of potatoes, beets, and pumice stone 1
A.

Not except we have to have a load of cinders
or gravel.

Q.

That is local, they might handle that~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. Then, the work is similar1
A.

It is similar, yes, sir.''

In describing the work train, Baker testified (R. 786) :

"Q. Are they ever sent out to replace ballast?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And haul out ties, replace ties 1
A. Take out for delivery, and pick up, as they
are loaded.

Q.

Now, these work trains are slow moving
trains, aren't they~
A. Yes, ordinarily.

Q. They move from place to place slowly 1
A. That is right.
Q. They have a lot of men in the outfit 1
A. Yes, they would have them.
Q. That is right 1
A. That is right.
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Q. And it is in trains like that that it is permissible to handle the caboose ahead of the train;
isn't that right~
.\. It would be of that nature.
Q.

And, as you have said, the rule refers to work
train service and not work train orders ; is
that right~

A.

That is right."

With reference to Rule 802 (j) and its prohibition
against handling cars ahead of the engine between stations, he admitted that the following stations were on
the Branch line between Idaho Falls and Indian: Orvin,
Lincoln Junction, Wilkinson, Ammon, Hackman and
Indian, and that all of the stations were so listed in the
Time-Table.
With respect to that portion of the rule which states:

'' * * * except when necessary to take cars to
or from a spur * * * and the movement then must
be for no greater distance than necessary.''
The witness admitted that it could be complied with
even though a car was ahead of the train when the train
reached the first siding.
The witness, at R. 798, admitted that a train regularly assigned, which operated on a schedule, would not
be a work train. 'He likewise admitted that an extra train
might be designated as a work extra whether it was i!n.
work train service or not.
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(3) JORGENSEN'S PLACE OF WORK, THE PLATFORM ON THE LEADING END OF THE MAKESHIFT
CABOOSE AS IT WAS BEING PROPELLED ALONG, WAS
DANGEROUS, HAZARDOUS AND UNSAFE.

The car supplied by defendant to its crew for use
as a place to work and where Jorgensen was working
when he lost his life, was a large automobHe car which
had been remodeled into a makeshift caboose. (R. 339).
Exhibit "A" is a side view of the car. Exhibits
''B'', ''C'' and ''I'' are rear view pictures.
At this point we desire to call the Court's attention
to photographs (Exhibits "D", "E" and "F") which
depict the tracks at and in the vicinity of the point where
Jorgensen was killed. (R. 363).

·l

>1

:;~

~j

It was much larger in length and height than an
ordinary standard caboose and was being used on the
job when Croft went to work September 22nd (R. 341).
It had no cupola (R. 345).
It was, to use a word of Freeman, a "rough rider"
and swayed and pitched as it was being moved along
over the Goshen Branch Line tracks.
In describing its riding qualities Croft testified that
it was an awful hard, rough rider and that it rode rough
both on main line and branch line tracks. He testified
that he had ridden it over the main line tracks between
Idaho Falls and Pocatello at the approximate speed of
forty miles an hour and that under these conditions it

In
:~rio1

-'1€lll(
~nll!
·~e~
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was ahnost impossible ''to stand on your feet in the
caboose" without being thrown off balance (R. 342-3).
Croft likewise stated that the Goshen Branch line
tracks were not maintained as well as the main line
tracks and that while it was being moved over the Goshen
Branch line tracks a brakeman "would have to hold onto
anything he could get his hands on'' or he would lose
his balance, and that the caboose had a lot of swayini,
and bouncing up and down (R. 343). He testified that
it was impossible to write while in the caboos-e (R. 344).
On cross examination he testified that when riding
the caboose a brakeman "don't just stand there"-that
he would want to hold onto something (R. 422). F'rom
the Record, 422, we quote :

'' Q. I see. You weren't holding onto the grab
iron because of the rough riding of the caboose, were you 1·
A.

This special caboose, yes, sir.

Q. You say you

were~

A. Yes, sir.

• * *
It was a rough rider and you had to hang
on." (R.423).
In a most interesting cross ·examination, Croft fully
described and demonstrated the swaying and pitching
movement of this caboose. We believe this cross examination under leading and suggestive questions by railroad
counsel, who presumably was well acquainted with all the
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facts in the case, would be most instructive and helpful
to the Court. (It will he recalled that the cross examiner,
Mr. Leverich was on the tracks where Jorgensen was
killed with other company officials and a photographer
on March 11, 1947, when the movie (Ex. "4") was made,
(R. 761, 770). Mr. Leverich's likeness does not appear
in any of the moving pictures. It is therefore assumed,
that he was in the so-called caboose, while the moving
pictures were being made. At least he was in a position
to observe the movements at first hand. He was there
for that purpose. If this assumption is correct, he was
peculiarly well fitted by his own experiences to lead this
witness, who, like the examiner, was a company employee.)
For that reason the examination is set forth in full herein (R. 425-29) :

"Q.

Now, I think you stated to Mr. Black that
this caboose bumped and swayed and jerked;
is that right~
A. Yes, sir.

Q.

Can you describe for us a little how much
bumping-, or, first, let me ask you, what do
you mean by bumping, up and down~
A. An up and down movement~
Q.
A.

An up and down
Yes, sir.

movement~

Q. What do you mean by 'swaying'~
A. The caboose was swaying from one side to
the other.
Q. What do you mean by 'jerking'~
A. And 'jerking' would be back and forth.
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Q.

The same as

A.

Only a different direction.

Q.

By 'swaying', you mean from side to side; is
that right?

swaying~

A. From side to side.

Q.

''l1at do you mean by 'jerking'~

A.

A back and forth movement.

Q.

A forward and backward movement~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And bumping up and

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Now, this car had an awful swaying motion,
didn't it, Mr. Croft~

down~

A. Yes, sir.

:7

Q.

It swayed so bad you couldn't hardly stand
up on the car, could you~

A.

That is

Q.

In fact, you had to hold on to everything in
order to even get around in the car; that is
right, isn't it~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And you could hardly sit down in it, even,
could you, Mr. Croft~

A.

Q.

Yes.
And if you would sit down in it the car would
sway so much you would be thrown out of
your seat'

A.

Yes, sir.

~!

right~
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Q. You have been thrown out of your seat on
many occasions, on this car, haven't you, Mr.
Croft?
A.

I wouldn't say many occasions.

Q. Have you ever gone to the steps on the side
of the caboose when it was in motion, and
looked backward or forward from that position?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. And it was swaying the same as you have
described it now, on those occasions; that is
right, isn't it 1
A. Yes, sir, that is right.

Q. And it would throw you right off the side of
the caboose, would it not, Mr. Croft 1
A.

It would if you wouldn't hold on.

Q. If you would hold on, it wouldn't!
A.

That is right.

Q.

Now, do you have a judgment, Mr. Croft,- as
to how much swaying motion there would be,
for instance, on the top of that caboose 1

A.

I don't know just how much.

Q. Your best judgment?
A. Well, it swayed, and if you we~e up ahead of
this caboose where you could see it, it swayed
so much it looked like it would turn over.
Q.

Do you have a judgment in feet Y

A.

Oh, I don't know just for sure how many feet
it would be.
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Q. Well, do you have a judgm·ent about it, Mr.
Croft. I don't want you to be exact. I know
you can't. How far would it go to one side,
and how far would it go to the other side~
A.

It would sway so if you were riding up on
the head end you could see it sway out on both
sides of the train.

Q. "\Yhat do you mean by 'head end'~
A.

If you were riding on the engine.

Q.

If you were riding on the engine, do you have
a judgment how far it would come out on each
side!

A.

I would say a foot or two feet.

You would say a foot or two feet on each
A. Yes, sir.

Q.

side~

Q. That is your best judgment~
A. That is my best judgm·ent.
Now, would that be the top of the caboose,
Mr. Croft'
A. Yes, sir.

Q.

Q. And, by the 'top of the caboose' you mean
this portion I am pointing to on Exhibit B;
that is right, isn't itT
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, with respect to the bumping-withdraw
that.
I wonder if you can come down and demonstrate to the jury, Mr. Croft, on this swaying motion with your body, if you ean demonstrate how much it would sway'
A. I can almost explain.
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Q.
A.

I wonder if you would show us Y
Well, walking on the caboose when it is swaying, it keeps you going from side to side on
the caboose, like this (indicates).

Q.

Suppose you were standing, demonstrate how
it would go, this way and this way, when you
were standing~ (Indicates).
Of course, if you were standing still and swaying, it would make your body have a swaying
motion.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Illustrate with your body the
Back and forth (indicates).

motion~

Back and forth, in that manner?
Yes, sir.
Now, with respect to the bumping, that is the
up and down movement~

A. Yes, sir.
Q. I wonder if you can describe that a little moTe
for us?·

A. This bumping up and down, standing in this
caboose would make your feet leave the caboose, up and down.

Q.

I see. So that when you were standing in the
caboose perfectly still, I mean you were perfectly still, that caboos,e would bump so hard
your feet would leave the floor, is that right 1

A. That is right.
Q. I wonder if you could demonstrate that down
here, Mr. Croft?

A. This caboose, it is this motion standing there,
up and down on the front.
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Q. About the extent you have indicated Y
A.

Yes.

Q. \V ould you do that again ; inches!

two or three

~\..

(Indicates). I would say about that.

Q.

~\.bout

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

~ow,

with respect to the jerking motion, I
wonder if you will describe that for us a little
more¥

A.

"\Vell, the jerking motion of a car is the forward and backward motion of the car.''

two or three inches off of the

floor~

(R. 443):

"Q. Now, as I recall, before we recessed for
lunch, you stated that the bouncing and the
swaying might cause a person to lose his footing, and thereby be thrown off the end of the
caboose; is that right?
A.

A man could lose his footing, yes.''

Croft further testified that while the train was moving along just prior to Jorgensen's death he was hanging
on the grab iron because there was always a possibility
of a man losing his footing if he wasn't holding onto
something, on account of the movem·ent of the car, and
that the usual and ordinary motion of the car and the
swaying motion and bouncing up and down of the car
could be sufficient to cause a man to lose his balance and
fall (R. 433).
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Brown testified, at Record 568, that a brakeman
working and stationed upon the front platform at the
leading end of a caboos-e being shoved along ahead of
the train could well be thrown off by the swaying of the
car.
Freeman testified (R. 659) with respect to the bouncing and lateral motion of this caboose while being shoved
along over the tracks, and at (R. ·660) that the caboose
was rigid and that it was almost impossible to write in
it when moving, and at (R. 683) that "it was more or
less a bouncing and a lateral motion'' and that he had
difficulty riding the caboose when it was going over the
line. He 'testified (R. 683, 684) that he had complained
about the way the caboose rode and had asked the yardmaster to take it up with the officials and try to get a
different caboose for him. His testimony on this point
is as follows (R. 684) :

"Q. And why did you want a different caboose?
A. Well, on account of the riding qualities.
You say in regard to riding qualities. Explain what you m·ean by that.
A. Well, the caboose was rigid, and it was impossible to write on it when the train was
moving.
Q.

Anything else t
A. Well, that was my objections to it.

Q.
Q.

And were these requests made prior to this
accident~·

A. Yes.''
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And at ( R. 685), he testified :

'' Q. About how many requests did you make for
them to take it off?
A.

Oh, I would say a couple of times.''

In comparing the caboose with the riding qualities
of a standard caboose Freeman testified:
''The ordinary cabooses ride a lot smoother'' (R.
712) and that it was ''a harder caboose to write or ride
in" (R. 713).
The fact that this makeshift caboose was not equipped with a cupola likewise subjected the brakemen to
extraordinary and unnecessary hazards.
At R. 344-45 Croft testified:
''A.

On a regular caboose you have a cupola that
has windows on the front, ·and side and rear,
windows all the way around, rather, and you
sit in this cupola, and we hav·e an air valv·e
there, and we can set the air on the brakes
on the train, and you can see almost any direction from this cupola you want to see.
*

* •

'' Q. Where would you have been if that caboose
had been a standard equipped caboose, with
a cupola~·
A.

We would probably have been in the cupola,
riding in the cupola, when we have a caboose
with one.''
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Conductor Freeman, at R. 702-703, gave testimony to
the following effect:
'' Q.

All right. You may state whether or not, had
you had a caboose with a cupola on it, that it
would have been the place for Jorgensen and
Croft to have been in the cupola, instead of
where they were standing¥

A.

Well, I would say it would be Croft's duty
to be in the cupola.

Q.

What about Jorgensen¥

A.

I don't know that it would be his duty, but
he could be there, if he wished. Unless he
would be on the engine.''

( 4) THE MAKESHIFT SAFETY CHAIN (EXHIBIT 1)
WAS INADEQUATE, UNSAFE AND DANGEROUS AND
DUE TO ITS INSUFFICIENCIES WAS LIKELY TO AND
DID BECOME DISENGAGED AND FAILED IN ITS FUNCTION WHEN PUT TO THE TEST OF USE.

Exhibit No. "1" was the chain removed from \Jar
UP 05706 on the 29th day of October, 1947, by A. L. Say,
mechanical foreman of the railroad company a:t Ida:ho
Falls (R·. 612-623). We respectfully submit that the chain
itself, toge'ther with the part it played in the tragic accident resulting in the death of Jorgensen, is the very best
possible evidence of its insufficiency as a safety device.
We suggest that any simple experiment will reveal the
ease and great probability of it becoming disengaged at
a time when human life might depend upon its proper
functioning as a safety measure. We shall rest our case
on this matter by an invitation to ·examine Exhibit 1
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and by the citation of the testimony with regard to the
chain, its hook and its purpose and function.
Freeman, the Conductor, testified with reference to
the purpose of the safety chain at R. 689:

'' Q. And what is the purpose of that chain, that
safety chain~
A.

\Yell, as the name implies, a safety chain, to
keep a person from falling out the end ,of the
caboose.''

In comparing the so-called safety chain, Exhibit 1,
with ordinary chains, Croft said (R. 360) :
''This chain that was on the caboose was-had
a smaller hook on than on ordinary chains that
are on cabooses, had a very short hook end on it.''
Croft thought the hook of the chain, which was on
the caboose when Jorgensen met his death, was about
half the size of the hook which appears in Exhibit "C"
(R. 361).
At R. 471-472, Croft testified that he did not r,egard
safety chain (Exhibit 1) as being a safe and proper safety chain because he did not think it had a proper hook

:,

on it; that the hook was too small, too short, and that it
\Vas not the usual and ordinary safety chain hook. 'That
the ordinary safety chain would have a hook about twice
as long, and he stated on cross examination (R. 449)
that Exhibit 1 was not a substantial safety chain.
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He furthe·r testified at (R. 482-483):
"Q. Now, what differenee does a shorter hook
make, Mr. Croft, if any?
A.

There would be more possibility for a short
hook coming out than one which had a longer
hook on it.''

He also testified that he believed the hook on the
safety chain was of such nature that it could be forced
out of the hole by anything coming in contact with it,
and that if something came in contact with the hook it
would be disengaged (R. 483).
Fenton Wilson, a Switchman in the yards at Idaho
Falls and a brother-in-law of deceased, testified that
shortly after the accident and before the train had been
moved, he ·examined and tested the so-called safety chain,
and stated (R. 515):
'' Q.

Tell the jury what you did to test it,.

A. I pushed down. on it, and found by pushing
down in the middle of it, the hook was so short
it woufJJd come up a fraction and jump out, and
if you pushed down real fast and hard it
would jump out.
Q.

What would happen if the chain was struck
from underneath, a side-swiping motion?

A. It would come out."
Wilson further testified at R. 516 that he had never
seen a safety chain before with a hook on it like the one
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on Exhibit "1 ", and that in his opinion the chain (Exhibit "1 ") was not a standard safety chain.
Leo A. vVilliams, the Coroner and Mortician at Idaho
Falls, testified that he examined the chain at the scene
of the accident shortly after its occurrence and at R.
504 testified :

"Q. N"ow, :Mr. Williams, 'what can you say with
respect to the ease or difficulty of removing
the hook from the ring?
A. Well, it was not difficult to remove. With
just a simple twist of the hand it could be
unhooked, without too much of a backward
motion of the wrist.

Q. With very slight change of position of the
hook you could lift it out of the hole; is that
right?
A. With just a slight revers·e action of the wrist
it could be unhooked.

Q. By Mr. Black:
A slight reverse action of the wrist?
A. A slight upward twist of the chain could unhook it.''
There is some evidence that the chain (Exhibit "1")
when in place, did not sway downward as far as the chain
shown in Exhibit "J", and we believe this is true. The
double link, which forms the permanent attachment to
the post near the brake wheel as shown in Exhibit "J",
seems to be longer than the makeshift permanent ring
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

68
link attachment on Exhibit "1." The hook link on Exhibit" 1" is not so long as the hook link on Exhibit" J".
However, there are 23 links in the chain (Exhibit "1")
and only 22 links on the chain shown in Exhibit "J".
Croff testified, and his evidence was not disputed,
that immediately after J orgens en fell from the car he
observed the safety chain and it was hanging down. (R.
370).
(5) THE FATAL EVENT WAS PROXIMATELY
CAUSED BY DEFENDANT'S VARIOUS ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE, COMBINED AND CONCURRING.

Jorgensen was the head brakeman on the local the
day of his death (R. 328).
As the train proceeded along the Branch Line Track
toward Indian, the two brakemen, Jorgensen and Croft,
were stationed on the front platform of the caboose. The
conductor was inside the caboose (R. 336-337). The duties
of the brakemen We're described by Croft as rollows (R.
345):

"Q. What were your duties, and Jorgensen's duties, as the tr~ain was proceeding down towards Indian, shortly before he was killed¥
A.

We had to be on this platform, on this caboose, when crossing ail crossings, there is
several crossings here, and there is generally
a lot of livestock out there, from farming communities, and you have to look out for automobiles and livestock, and anything that
would obstruct the movement of the train.''
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On cross examination at R. 456, Croft testified:
~Ir. Jorgensen to perform his duties, it wasn't necessary for him to stand in
the PQsition you have described, was it~

'' Q. Now, for

A.

'Yell, he could stand anywhere on that platform to perform his duties.''

Freeman, the conductor, testified that one of the
duties of the brakeman was to keep a lookout back along
the train as it moved along. At R. 710-11 he testified:

'' Q. In order to watch the rear portion of the
train from the caboose, when it was in front,
what position would the brakeman have to
take~

A. Well, he would have to get on the step and
look back one side or the ·other, either the
right hand or the left whichever he preferred.

11\

·-

-~

Q.

-. ;

And he couldn't see to the rear without getting out on the step, could he~

.,

A. No, he would have to look out on the step.

,.

That's what they are there for."
As the train proceeded along Jorgensen was standing near the opening above the coupler, protected by the
safety chain, and Croft was standing at his right (R.
347, 348). Jorgensen was operating the tail hose equipment at the leading end of the caboose. This hose was
used for two purposes: (a) as an air whistle, actuated
by the manipulation of a small valve, and (h) to set the
brakes by the m·anipulation of the angle cock (R. 349).
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Croft testified that when the train was taken out of
Idaho Falls for the trip down the Branch Line shortly
prior to Jorgensen's death, he observed the safety chain
and it was in place.
With respect to Jorgensen's position just before he
fell from the train Croft, at R. 470-471 testified:

"Q. Was there anything unusual in Jorgensen's
position the last time you saw him~
A.

No sir."

(R. 471-472) :

''Q.

You stated that you had used this tail hose
from time to time~

:t~~

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

And I suppose sounded the air whistle~

A. Yes sir.

Q.

And about where would you stand when you
were operating the whistle and the tail hose
brake~

A.

About in the same vicinity.

Q.

Wher.e Jorgensen was

A.

Where Jorgensen was standing, yes sir.''

standing~

In describing the speed of the train and its swaying and pitching immediately prior to Jorgensen's death,
Croft testified at R. 366, 368:
'' Q.

Now, I direct your attention to the movement of this train before Jorgensen lost his
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life, and I will ask you to describe, as near as
you can, the speed the train was traveling at
that timeT
.A. Approximately twenty miles an hour.

\\7 hat would you say with respect to the movement, or motion of the so-called caboose, on
which you men were working at that time
just before Jorgensen was killed~
A. This caboose always had a tendency to sway
and bounce up and down; in fact, it did that
all the time, no matter where you had it.
Q.

Q. \Vas it swaying or bouncing just before he
was killed~
A. Yes sir."
In describing Jorgensen's fall from the train, Croft
testified (R. 366-8):

"Q. Just before Jorgensen was killed, what did·
you dof
A. I was standing to the right of Jorgensen; we
were talking just ordinary talk we talked
every day, and I turned my head and was
looking out the side of the caboose, arnd I
heard this commo~t®on, and I turned and I
could see Brakeman Jorgensen about half
way between the caboose and the ground.
Q. Will you describe his fall, in some detail~
A. He fBll face forward, with his hands out in
front of him. It looked like he lit on his hands
and feet. He fell inside the rails toward the
left, inside the rails.
Q. BetwBen the rails~
A. Yes, sir.
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Q. Now, desc.ribe

·~he

nolise that you designated

as 'Commotion'?

A. This noise I hetard was like metal comilng
ag.ainst metal, is the .noise I heard; that is
what made me trurn my head.

Q.

While you were on this platform, did you and
Jorgensen notice the safety chain 1

A.

Yes.

Q.
A.
Q.

What position was it

in~

The safety chain was across and in position.
As I understand, you saw Mr. Jorgensen as
he was falling down on the rails onto the
track~

A.
Q.
A.

Yes sir.
What did you do¥
I immediately crossed over to this air valve,
this air lever, and pulled on the air on the
train, and as soon as we came to a stop I
walked back to the .engineer and told the engigeer, Stoddard, we had run over Wendell.

ill
Qmrut

mann

11'%

Q.

Go ahead, did you find his body underneath
the train~

A.

I asked Mr. Stoddard if he would go back. I
didn't immediately go back, and Mr. Stoddard went back to look at the body.

mnovl

Where, underneath the train was the body, at
this time~

j~ow]e

* * •

il!nm

Q.

A.

We found the body back four or five cars
behind the engine.''
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(R. 370):

"Q. Did you see it (the safety chain) at any time
after Jorgensen fellY
A.

The only time I ever saw this chain after Jorgensen fell was right after the accident, the
chain was hanging down, that is the last time
I saw the chain."

Also (R. 370-71) :

'' Q. How far were you from the Lincoln J unction at the time this accident occurred.
A.

It would be in the vicinity of about ten miles,
maybe a little over ten miles.

Q. That would be about ten miles from Idaho
Falls, wouldn't it Y
A.

Yes sir; about ten miles from Idaho Falls."

In concluding this phase of our brief we respectfully
submit that it clearly appears from the admitted facts
and uncontroverted evidence that the jury by its verdict
of ''No Cause of Action,'' thereby absolving the defendant of any negligence whatsoever, entirely disregarded
and overlooked the following facts :

(a) Defendant made up its train with the caboose
ahead of the engine with the full knowledge or means of
knowledge that in so doing it thereby subjected its brakemen to unusual and unnecessary danger and hazard; and
(b) There was no necessity or reason for placing
the caboose ahead of the train and in making up and
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operating its train, as it did, defendant violated its own
Operating Rule 802 ( J) ; and
(c) Jorgensen's place of work, the platform on the
leading end of the makeshift caboose as it was being propelled along, was dangerous, hazardous and unsafe; and
(d) The makeshift safety chain (Exhibit 1) was
inadequate, unsafe and dangerous and due to its insufficiencies was likely to and did become disengaged and
failed in its function when put to the test of use; and
(e) The fatal event was proximately caused by defendant's various acts of negligence, combined and concurring.
Can it he doubted that the jury disregarded, as the
trial court stated, the uncontroverted evidence (1) that
the caboose from which the decedent fell was being propelled ahead of the locomotive and of the train thereby
rendering such an accident as caused the death of the
deceased possible; and (2) that the safety chain (Exhibit
1) was inadequate, at least that when put to the test it
failed to perform the function for which it was intended.
It is submitted that if the uncontroverted evidence
on the charges of neglect had been given any weight or
consideration whatsoever by the jury the verdict would
have been for plaintiff. This evidenoe, so completely disregarded by the jury, demonstrated a cl_ear causal connection between defendant's neglect as charged and proved
and decedent's death.
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If the purpose of jury trials is to accomplish a just
result, if the function of the trial court is to prevent miscarriages of justice by the exercise of its wide discretionary power to grant new trials, then there was nothing
else for the trial court to do except grant, as it did, plaintiff's motion for new trial.

(C) GROUNDS URGED BY PLAINTIFF IN
THE TRIAL COURT I~ SUPPORT OF HIS l\10TION
FOR NE\Y TRIAL.
The following grounds were set forth and urged by
plaintiff in his motion for new trial (R. 136, 13'7) :
'' 3. The Court erred in refusing to give to
the jury certain instructions requested hy plaintiff in the manner and form as requested.
'' 4. Irregularity in the proceedings of the
Court, the jury and the orders of the Court and
abuse of discretion by which the plaintiff was prevented from having a fair trial.
'' 7. Newly discovered evidence material for
the plaintiff which he could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the
trial.
'' 8. That the verdict and judgment are contrary to the evidence and against law.
"9. Error in law occurring at the trial and
excepted to by the plaintiff.
'' 10. The Court ought to grant a new trial in
the exercise of its inherent power to prevent injus'tice and to secure to all litigants a fair and impartial trial. ' '
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In the presentation of the motion for new trial before the trial court, plaintiff maintained that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; that the
verdict was against the evidence, and that the verdict
itself was obviously a grave miscarriage of justice, especially in view of the Federal Employer's Liability Act
which makes the carrier liable when its negligence has
contributed in whole or in part to the cause of injury or
death. We have fully presented the evidence on that
matter and will not reargue it here. We are content with
again suggesting that on the matter of negligence the
evidence was all one way and that the charges of negligence were supported by the overwhelming weight of
proof and that the verdict of the jury indicated a complete and total disregard of admitted facts and facts established beyond peradventure of doubt by the uncontradicted evidence.
Several additional grounds were presented in support of the motion.
GROUND i.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO.7 (R. 110).

The trial court committed prejudicial error in the
granting and giving of defendant's Request No. 16 (R.
122) in its Instruction No. 7 (R. 110) and in particular
that portion of the Instruction which states as follows:

'' * * * In this connection you are instructed
that the mere happening of an accident is no proof
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

:Hilt

77
of negligence on the part of anyone or evidence
of the same.''
By this instruction important and pertinent facts
supported by the testimony upon which plaintiff relied
as establishing negligence on the part of defendant were
withdrawn from jury consideration. Plaintiff relied upon
the facts surrounding the occurrence of the accident as
proof of negligence. The happening of the accident involved the fact that the plain tiff was working upon a
platform at the forward end of the makeshift caboose
while it was being propelled along in front of the train
and that the caboose due to its structure and the condition of the tracks was swaying and pitching to such an
extent as to imperil deceased's balance and that while so
stationed and while so engaged deceased fell to his death
due to the failure of the safety chain to perform its
function.

These facts made up the integral parts of the "happening of the accident" and still the Court instructed the
jury that ''the mere happening of an accident is no proof
of negligence on the part of anyone or evidence of the
same.'' In view of this instruction it is not so difficult to
understand why the jury returned the unjust verdict of
which plaintiff complained.

i·

We have been unable to find any case where an instruction of this kind has ever been approved by an appellate court in any case remotely resembling the case
at bar.
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The law on this point is clearly declared and stated
in 38 A merioan Jurisprudence beginning at the top of
page 985, in the following language:
"While it is true that simply because an accident has occurred, negligence is not to be presumed, still, in determining the question of negligence, the fact that an accident has occurred may
be and should be taken into consideration, in connection with all other facts and circumstances of
the case, for the purpose of determining whether
in fact there was negligence. Negligence may be
inferred from circumstances surrounding the injury, if not from the fact of the injury itself."
In the footnote at page 985 of 38 Amerioarn Juris-

prudence appears the following supported statement:
''No general rule can be laid down that the
mere occurrence of an accident is or is not sufficient prima facie proof of actionable negligence.
* * * Griffin v. Boston & A. R. Co., 148 Mass.
143, 19 N. E. 166, 1 L.R.A. 698, 12 Am. St. Rep.
526.
''Negligence, like any other fact, may be inferred from the circumstances, and the case may
be such that though there be no positive proof
that the defendant has been guilty of any neglect
of duty, the inference of negligence would be irresistible. Barnowsky v. Helson, 89 Mich. 523, 50
N. W. 989, 15 L.R.A. 33."
This Court has without doubt recognized this fundamental and controlling proposition. See Lewis v. Davis,
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59 Utah 85, 201 P. 861. This Court, at page 864 of 201 P.
stated:

'' ~-\. t the close of plaintiffs' evidence defendant moved for a nonsuit, and when all of the
evidence was submitted moved for a directed verdict. Both motions were denied. Defendant excepted to both rulings of the court and argues the
exceptions together. The grounds assigned for
the nwtion are (1) failure to prove defendant's
negligence at all; (2) failure to show that defendant permitted gas to leak; ( 3) the evidence shows
that deceased was guilty of contributory negligence; ( 4) the injury, if caused by failure to properly care for the generator, was due to the negligence of fellow servants; (5) the evidence fails
to show the proximate cause of the injury; (6)
the deceased assumed the risk. The gist of defendant's contention in support of this assignment
seems to be that there is no definite proof of any
specific act or omission on the part of defendant
constituting negligence which was the proximate
cause of the injury.
"It is true that no one saw the accident happen. No one knew just what Mr. Lewis was doing
when the explosion occurred. No one testified that
the generator leaked gas, or that the hose was disconnected, thereby permitting gas to escape. No
one saw water and carbide in the tank, or noticed
the condition of the float. No one saw the generator so as to see whether it had been taken apart,
or whether the parts were in place, each performing its function in the generation of gas. No one
knows the immediate cause of the explosion, or
just how Mr. Lewis came to his death.
''The above propositions, in substance, constitute the basis upon which defendant relies in
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support of the contention that the court erred in
denying its motion for nonsuit and directed verdict.
''In the opinion of the court, under the evidence in the record, the fact that an explosion
actually occurred is an answer to practically every
proposition above set forth. If there had been
no water and no carbide in the generator under
pressure by means of a float on top and no gas
leaking or hose disconnected by which gas could
escape and no contact between the gas and a
lighted torch or other fire there could have been
no expJosion, and if there had been no explosion
Robert Lewis would not have been killed in the
manner shown by the evidence.''
Plaintiff charged defendant with failure to furnish

'nr:

Jorgensen a safe place to work. Deceased falling from
the moving train under the circumstances revealed was
proper proof of this allegation. Plaintiff charged defendant with originating and following a dangerous and
unsafe practice in making up its trains and moving them
over the Goshen Branch Line tracks. Jorgensen's fatal
fall was proper proof of this. Plainti~ charged that the
roadbed was maintained in a rough and uneven condition; that as a result of the condition of the roadbed
and the structure of the makeshift caboose an unusual
amount of swaying and pitching of the car resulted and
that this swaying and pitching subjected men stationed,
as Jorgensen was, to an extreme and extraordinary hazard. His fatal fall was proof of this fact.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

:.]1'

81
Plaintiff eharged defendant with failure to install
a safe and adequate safety ehain aeross the opening over
the coupler at the forward end of the platform. J orgensen 's fatal fall proved this charge.
Jorgensen's position on the platform, the condition
of the traek, the swaying movement of the car, the failure of the safety chain to perform its function, the fact
of falling are all parts, and necessary parts, of the accident, but under the Court's instruction these facts, admitted and proved, were eliminated as having no evidentiary value whatsoever in determining the question of
negligenee.
The principle that the accident may be proper proof
of negligence was clearly recognized by this Court in
Perriln li. Union Pac. R. Co., 59 Utah 1, 201 P. 405. In
that case the happening of the accident and the facts surrounding it were found to be entirely sufficient to support the verdict of the jury favorable to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff cited in support of its contention on this matter
the following authorities: Patrick W etter:er v. The Atchison, Topeka and Sanba Fe Ry. Oo., 277 Ill. App. 275.
Plaintiff never at any time contended that proof of
injury was proof of negligence, or that the mere proof
of the happening of the accident was sufficient evidence
to take a case to the jury. Plaintiff's eontention was that
the jury was told that the happening of the accident was
no evidence of negligence, and that therefore the jury
was not to take into consideration in their deliberations
the happening of the accident as in any way aiding them
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in determining whether negligence on the part of the
defendant existed. See Orris v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry.
Co., (Mo.) 214 S. W. 125, where this point was discussed
and illustrated. See also Southern Ry. !Co. v. Smith
(Ala.) 221 Ala. 273, 128 S. 228. See also Hankims v. Reimers, 86 Nebr. 307, 125 N. W. 516; Paulsen v. McA.v~oy
Brewing Co., 226 Ill. App. 605, and Grauer v. A.Zabama
(-Jrea.t Southern R. Co., 209 Ala. 568, 96 S. 915.
In Hackley v. Southern Pacific Co., (Cal.) 45 P. (2d)
447, that court held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
was applicable where a brakeman fell to his death from
a car at the rear end of a train. See also Oettimger v.
Stewart, 137 P. (2d) 852.
From the Rackley case at page 452, we quote as
follows:
"We do not need to cite authorities to the
effect that direct proof is not required to show
a negligent act which leads to an employee's death.
If such negligent act is established by circumstantial evidence, and if the circumstantial evidence
justifies an inference of a negligent act upon an
officer or another employee of the company, the
finding of the court or jury will not be disturbed.
We will, however, call attention to the following
cases: Line v. Erie R. Co. (C. C. A.) 62 F. (2d)
657; Mulligan v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 104
S. C. 173, 88 S. E. 445; Hurley v. Illinois Central
R. Co., 133 Minn. 101, 157 N. W. 1005.
''Inferences ·and presumptions which may be
drawn from circumstances surrounding any event
under consideration are not necessarily destroyed
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by opposing testimony, but remain to be considered by the trial court and jury in reaching a conclusion. This court, in the case of Beers v. California State Life Ins. Co., 87 Cal. App. 440, 262
P. 380, in an opinion written by ~fr. Justice Hart,
considered Yery fully the subject of presumptions
and inferences, and the fact that they remain in
the case for consideration by the trial court, as
well as testimony which may tend to overcome
either an inference or presumption. Other cases
might be cited supporting the same rule as set
forth in the Beers Case, supra, but to do so would
only unnecessarily lengthen this opinion.''
In the case at bar plaintiff charged negligence generally. See paragraph IX subsection (a) (R. 3) which under all the authorities is entirely sufficient as far a.s
pleading is concerned to present and bring a case under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. See J esionowski v.
Bost·on & JJ aine R. R., 329 U. S. 452, 67 S. Ct. 401, 91 L.
Ed. 416; 21 Negligence Compensation Cases Annot~ated
(N.S.) 563.

GROUND II.

·-

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND IN
REFUSING TO ADEQUATELY INSTRUCT THE JURY ON
PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF LIABILITY AS SET FORTH
AND CONTAINED IN PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 3 AND 6 (R. 96, 99).

Plaintiff charged defendant with the failure to in-

stall and maintain an adequate and sufficient safety
chain, and 1nuch of the proof was directed to this point.
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Plaintiff contended that this chain, due to its insufficiency and inadequacy, failed to perform its function
when put to the test of ordinary and expected usage and
that when deceased either leaned or was thrown against
the chain it became unhooked, thereby causing and permitting him to either fall or be thrown from the forward
end of the caboose in front of the moving train.
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 6 was a correct
and accurate statement of the law applicable. At no
other place in the Court's instructions was the jury apprised of plaintiff's theory. It is true that Instruction
No. 1 set forth the grounds of negligence upon which
plaintiff relied for recovery and that a subsequent instruction stated that unless plaintiff established one or
more of the grounds set forth in Instruction No. 1 he
could not recover. However, such a sketchy recital did
not fairly, properly or justly present plaintiff's theory.
Plaintiff was entitled to have his theory set forth clearly
and concisely in a single instruction. He should not have
been deprived of that fundamental and inherent right.
After the instructions of the court had been read to
the jury, counsel for plaintiff requested the Court to excuse the jury temporarily for the purpose of permitting
counsel to present a matter of law to the Court, and after
the jury had retired, the following statement was made
by plaintiff's counsel in connection with the Court's reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fusal to instruct the jury, as contained in Plaintiff's Request X o. 6 (R. S-!5) :
· •~IR. BLACK: Your Honor, one of the
most important charges of negligence that was
Inade in the complaint and in the evidence here
was in the safety chain.
·'In our request No. 6 we have requested an
instruction as follows : 'You are instructed tha;t
if you shall find by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant failed to furnish, install, supply and maintain adequate, secure and proper
safety chain and hook across the opening to the
rear of the platform of the caboose where decedent
·was stationed and working at and immediately
prior to the occurrence of the fatal accident, and
that such failure to furnish a proper, adequate
and secure safety chain and hook, if any you shall
find, proximately caused in whole or in part the
fatal injuries to decedent, then you should return
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant and award damages as in these instructions set forth.'
''We expressly urge the Court to grant the
request in that it has become so important in this
case, both as a matter of pleading and as a matter
of proof, we feel that the plaintiff is prejudiced
by the refusal of the Court to grant the instruetion as we have requested.''
In view of the above it cannot be contended that this
error was not sufficiently and timely called to the attention of the Court.
The Court not only deprived plaintiff of his right
to have his theory adequately presented to the jury, but
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on the contrary instructed the jury (Instruction No. 7,
R. 110), that the mere happening of the accident was no
proof of negligence on the part of anyone or evidence
of the same. Inasmuch as the failure of the chain was
part and parcel of the happening of the accident, the jury
was thus advised that the failure of the chain to function
was no proof of negligence. The result was that under
the Court's instruction plaintiff failed for the want of
a proper presentation of his theory even though he had
proved the inadequacy and insufficiency of the safety
chain, and the causal connection between the defendant's
negligence in this regard and the death complained of.
The plaintiff's theory as set forth in his Request
No. 6 not having been presented to the jury, the Court's
Instruction No. 7 had the eff·ect of taking from the jury
all consideration of the fact that the safety chain failed
permitting deceased to fall to his death. The jury was
thus precluded from finding from those circumstances
that the safety chain was insufficient and inadequate and
had not properly performed its function and that the
railroad company was therefore negligent. That either
party to a lawsuit is entitled to have his theory of the
case presented in form applicable to the evidence and
pleadings by proper instruction to the jury is a principle
of law firmly established in our jurisprudence.
In Furkovich v. Bilngham Co·al and Lumber Co., 45
Utah 89, 96, 143 P. 121, the Court stated:
''A charge should be adapted to the facts and
circumstances of the case on trial and not merely
embody a correct abstract legal principle.''
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Marti.n.ea.u v. Hanson (Feb. 8, 1916), -17 Utah 549,
557, 155 P. -132. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant
appeals. This was a suit upon a promissory note Inade
by defendant to plaintiff for the sum of $1,750. Error
was cited by the defendant in the refusal of the court to
instruct upon defendant's theory of the evidence in the
case. The court in supporting defendant's contention
and reversing stated:
"The court refused defendant's requests to
charge the jury which were based upon the theory
that the defendant did not know the financial
standing of John H. Ear1, and did not rely upon
his own jutlgment respecting Earl's ability to pay
the purchase price, but relied wholly upon the
statements and representations of the plaintiff in
that regard which defendant aUeged were false.
There was, to say the least, some evidence produced by the defendant in support of his theory
and averments in his answer, and for that reason
we think the court should have charged the jury
upon that phase of the case, if not in the language
requested by the defendant yet in substance to
that effect. Without pausing now to set forth the
charge as given, it is manifest from what has already been said that it did not sufficiently present to the jury either the law applicable to the
evidence or the defendant's theory of the case.
In this connection plaintiff's counsel insists that it
was the defendant's fault that the purchaser did
not fulfill the terms of his contract, and did not
pay the purchase price agreed upon. The defendant denied plaintiff's contention in that regard.
Whether the plaintiff's or the defendant's contention should prevail is a question of fact· for
the jury, and cannot affect defendant's right to
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have submitted to the jury his contention or theory of the case that the p1aintiff did misrepresent
the purchaser's ability to pay for the land, and
that he was not financially able to pay therefor,
and that for that reason defendant failed to obtain the purchase price agreed upon.''
In Toone v. J.P. O'Neill Canst. Co., (Jan. 16, 1912)
40 Utah 265, 121 P. 10, 16, this Court stated:
''Without now passing upon the question
whether the foregoing instruction was not too
broad in view of the evidence, we concede that a
party is entitled to have his case submitted to the
jury upon the theory of his evidence as well as
upon the theory of the whole evidence."

Pratt v. Utah Dight & Traction Co., (Feb. 5, 1918),
57 Utah 7, 169 P. 868, 869, 870. Action for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff while
attempting to board a car of defendant company on ~fain
Street in Salt Lake City. On judgment for plaintiff the
defendant appeals. Defendant cited as error refusal of
the trial court to grant his instruction to the effect that
"if the jury find from the evidence that plaintiff's injury
was not caused by the starting from a position of rest of
the car of the defendant but was caused by his action in
attempting to board such car while the same was in motion, then the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover."
The court in reversing stated :
"Each party to a suit is entitled to have his
theory, when there is evidence to sustain it, submitted to the jury and the judgment of the jury
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on the facts tending to support such theory, assuming always that there is testimony offered
to support the same, and this court has so held in
Hartley Y. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah, 121, 124 Pac.
522, where, speaking through Straup, J., it is said:
'' ·There are h\·o parties to a lawsuit. Each,
on a submission of the case to the jury, is entitled
to a submission of it on his theory and the law
in respect thereof. The defendant's theory as to
the cause of the accident is embodied in the proposed requests. There is some evidence as we
have shown, to render them applicable to the case.
That is not disputed. We think the court's refusal
to charge substantially as requested was error.
That the ruling was prejudicial and works a reversal of the judgment is self-evident and unavoidable.'

* * *

:II=

''Had the court given either of those instructions as requested or in substance and effect, we
should be inclined to hold that the issues presented
by the defendant's answer was sufficiently called
to the attention of the jury, and its finding on
that particular issue sufficiently determined. But,
as indicated, there is nowhere in the instructions
any direct or concrete statement instructing the
Jury that, if they found the facts as claimed by
the defendant, the plaintiff would not be entitled
to recover. This, in our judgment, should have
been done. Where the issues are definite and direct, and testimony is offered in support of the
different positions taken by the plaintiff and defendant, the court should, by unequivocal and unambiguous instructions, direct the jury's attention to the issues of fact as thus presented to be
determined by it, and there seems to be no good
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reason why such instructions should not have been
given. Such, in our judgment, was not done by the
court in its instructions in this case. The requests
on the part of the defendant were seasonably
made and were sufficient to direct the court's attention to the theory of the defendant's answer,
and should have been given, if not in the words as
submitted or requested, at least in substance and
effect.''

M org·wn v. Bingham Stage Lines Co. et al, (Dec. 13,
1929) 75 Utah 87, 283 P. 160, 166. Action by plaintiff for
the wrongful death of one Orson Morgan as a result of
the alleged negligence of defendant in operation of one
of its motor buses. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants
appeal. There was a conflict in the testimony as to
whether or not the motor vehicle driven by defendant
ran into plaintiff at a time when he was crossing the
street to mount a standing street car. Some of the testimony indicated that the street car was standing, some
that it was moving at the time of the accident. There
was evidence which the court found authorized submission to the jury of the question of defendant's negligence
in failing to operate the vehicle at a proper and safe
speed and in failing to keep a proper lookout. The court
in reversing and granting the new trial discussed the obligation of the trial court in granting instructions covering the theory of both parties to the case in the following
language:
"A party is entitled to have his case submitted to the jury on the theory of his evidence as
well as upon the theory of the whole evidence.
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Toone Y. O'Keill Const. Co., 40 Utah 265, 121 P.
10; Hartley Y. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124 P.
522, 3:Z:i, and ~liller v. Utah Consol. ThL Co. et al.,
53 Utah 366, 178 P. 771; Pratt v. Utah Light &
Traction Co., 57 Utah 7, 169 P. 868.

* * * *
"Respondent's counsel apparently do not
contest this rule of law, but they argue these requests were substantially covered, as the court
found was the case in the cases cited. The court
in other instructions set forth fully plaintiff's
theory of the evidence as to the alleged negligence
on the part of the defendants, but, except as
pointed out, gave no instructions on defendant's
theory.
'' \\TJlile the requests are not models of accuracy, we think the defendants were entitled to have
at least the substance of the same given so as to
present their theory of the evidence to the jury,
and that a failure on the part of the court to do so
was prejudicial error."
In IJforrison v. Perry, (Aug. 17, 1943) 104 Utah 151,
140 P. (2d) 772, 778, the Court stated:
"Defendant's theory, which was supported
by evidence, was that deceased, by driving on his
left-hand side of the highway, and his failure to
turn to his right side in time to avoid creating an
emergency, did create an emergency which confronted defendant through no fault of his. The
court failed to pro1p,erl;y separ~ate the the,ories of
the parties, but instead gave general ilnstructions
,t'f';eating the .rights and duties of each driver as
being mutual, w!ithout reg~ard to defend<ant's theSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ory as to dece1ased's negligence in first being ~on
his wrong side of the highwa;y. Defendant is entitled to have his case submitted to the jury on
any theory justified by proper evidence. Morgan
v. Bingham Stage Line Co., 75 Utah 87, 283 P.
160; Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124
P. 522; Pratt v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 57
Utah 7, 169 P. 868; Smith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362,
279 P. 893; Martineau v. Hanson, 47 Utah 549,
155 P. 432.''
All of the foregoing argument and authority lends
equal support to plaintiff's contention with respect to
the Court's refusal to grant and give plaintiff's Request
No. 3. By his Request No. 3 plaintiff sought to have the
theory set forth in his complaint to the effect that it was
defendant's duty to adopt and employ reasonably safe
methods in carrying on its business presented to the jury.
This request was refused. It correctly stated the law, and
was supported by the evidence. It was pr·ejudicial error

to refuse this request.
It is respectfully submitted that the verdict itself
conclusively demonstrates that the jury accepted the
Court's instruction to the effect that the happening of
the accident was no evidence of negligence and in the absence of positive instructions clearly presenting plaintiff's theory of the case, the jury no doubt believed that
all of plaintiff's evidence on liability which pertained to
the happening of the accident itself should be disregarded.
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GROUND III.
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 11
AND 12, (R. 75, 76) WERE ERRONEOUS AND CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

By Instruction Xo. 12 (R. 76) the Court instructed
the jury as follo·ws :
''You are instructed that if you find from a
preponderance of the evidence in this case that
Jorgensen came to his death solely as a result of
his own negligence, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover and your verdict should be in
favor of the defendant 'no cause of action'."
It is to be observed that under this instruction the
jury could return a verdict of ''No Cause of Action'' if
they found that the deceased was negligent and that such
negligence was the sole cause of his death. The Court,
in its Instruction No. 11 (R. 115), defined what conduct
on the part of the deceased constituted negligence. In
that instruction the Court stated:

'' * * * I therefore instruct you that if you
believe from the evidence in this case that Wendell J or gens en knowingly placed himself in a
position on the caboose in question that was less
safe than other positions which had been provided
for the performance of his duties, and he did so
knowing that the position in which he placed
himself, or in the exercise of ordinary care should
have known, was less safe, then I instruct you that
such action, if any you find, is negligence.''
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Obviously, under this instruction the jury was required to find that the deceased was negligent as matter
of law if he placed himself in a position that was less
safe than other positions which had been provided for
the performance of his duties. Hence, the Court instructed the jury that such conduct constituted, as matter of
law, negligence on the part of the deceased.
The law is clear that the rule which these instructions apparently attempted to apply is that where there
are two or more methods of performing work and the
injured person knowingly takes a dangerous method
when there are reasonably safe methods, he is guilty of
negligence. That, however, is not the manner in which
the rule was expounded to the jury here. There may
be two ways of doing work, one of which is less safe
than the other. But from the fact that one is comparatively less safe it does not follow that it is dangerous,
nor does it follow that a person choosing a less safe way
would be acting negligently in the sense that a reasonably prudent person would not have adopted that particular way.
The recent case of Raymond v. Union Pacific R.
Oo., (Utah) 191 Pac. (2d) 137, clear:ly states the distinction. There the Court stated:

"'* * * He (plaintiff) placed his hand in a
position which he knew to be aangerous, when
there was a safe method open to him.''
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The Court did not say, and the language used cannot
be stressed to mean, that if a person chooses a way less
safe than another in doing his work he is guilty of negligence as matter of law·.
This matter of choice of methods was recently discussed by the United States Supreme Court in the case
of TVilkerson r. LllcCarthy, (Utah), 69 S. Ct. 29, 413, and
from the opinion we quote :
"There was, as the state court pointed out,
evidence to show that petitioner could have taken
a slightly longer route and walked around the pit,
thus avoiding the use of the board. This fact,
however, under the terms of the Federal Employers Liability Act, would not completely immunize
the respondents from liability if the injury was
'in part' the result of respondents' negligence.
For while petitionetr's fa.ilu.re to use a safer
method of crossing might be found by the jury
to be contributory negligence, the Act provides
that 'contributory negligence shall .not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by
the jury in p1"opo.rtion to the ,amownt ,of negligence attributable to such employee. * * * ' ''
In the case of Condie v. Rio Grande Weste1"'n Railwaw Co., 34 Utah 237, 246, 247, 97 Pac. 120 (1908), this
Court had this same proposition before it, except that in
that case the trial court had refused the instru~tion
requested by the defendant. The Supreme Court held
that the statement contained in the requested instruction
was erroneous and hence had been properly refused.
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The first sentence of the requested instruction was as
follows:
'' * * * I charge you further as matter of
law that it was the duty of the plaintiff's intestate
to use ordinary care for his own safety, and
choose the safest course in performing his work
or in changing his position from one place to
another whenever such safe course was open,
plain, and obvious.* * *"
In discussing this the Court stated:
''The first sentence of the request is too
broad. It is not the law that a servant is in duty
bound 'to choose the safest course in performing
his work.' That is to say, there may be two
natural and usual ways of performing the work,
each of which is reasonably safe, and neither
dangerous, yet one may be safer than the other.
In such case it cannot he said as matter of law
that the servant is guilty of negligence because
he did not choose the safer one. The first sentence
of the request stated ahstrac:tly is in direct conflict with the second, wherein the principle is
sought to be correctly applied that, where there
is a natural and reasonably safe method of performing the work, the servant who voluntarily or
carelessly pursues a method which is ohviously
dangerous or known to him to be so is guilty of
contributory negligence. The request was, therefore, properly refused, though other portions of
it may not be objectionable."
The distinction which we seek to make between the
rule as stated by the trial court and the proper rule is
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well illustrated by this Condie case. The second sentence of the requested instruction is stated as follows :

'' * * * Therefore, if you find from the evidence that at the time of the accident there was
a reasonably safe way by which he might have
come out from under the engine, if it was necessary for him to come out at that time, and that
lmder these conditions he chose a way manifestly
and obviously unsafe and by this means lost his
life, the plaintiff cannot recover, and your verdict
must be for the defendant, 'No cause of action.' ''
In referring to this sentence the Court stated:

"* * * The last sentence of the request more
nearly stated that law, and might properly have
been given had not the conduct of the deceased
with respect to an emergency, or an unexpected
and sudden peril been involved.''
Here, the Court's instruction was contrary to the
rule as announced in the second sentence of the request
considered in the Condie case. The trial court did not
require the jury to find that there was a reasonably
safe way in which deceased could have performed his
duties and that he chose a way which was ''manifestly
and obviously unsafe.'' There was absolutely no requirement in the instruction that deceased must have
chosen an unsafe or dangerous way to perform his
duties. In this case the only requirement was that the
jury find that the method chosen by deceased was less
safe than some other method. This, we submit, is n1isSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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statement of the law, as is clearly indicated by the foregoing quotations from the Condie case.
This Court also stated the rule applicable to choice
of methods of work in the case of K(J;Un~arns v. White
Star Gas & Oil Co., 92 Utah 24, 32, 63 Pac. 2d 231 (1937).
In that case plaintiff was injured by an explosion of
gasoline vapors in performing the work of transferring
gasoline fron1 a tank car to a truck. Plaintiff had the
choice of using one of two methods, either by using a
pump operated by an electric motor or a pump operated
by hand. Plaintiff chose to use the electric motor and
defendant contended he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The Court stated:
"Upon the first proposition defendant invokes the rule that 'when there are two or more
methods or ways by which a servant may perform
his duties, and he voluntarily chooses the most
hazardous, knowing it to be such, he does so at
his own risk.' Fritz v. Salt Lake & Ogden Gas &
Elec. Light Co., 18 Utah 493, 56 P. 90, 93.
''Defendant attempted to show that he had
provided a hand pump to be used to load trucks
direct from the tank cars and that this was the
safe method of loading trucks, while using the
electric equipment was more dangerous; that
pJaintiff's use of the electric equipment was,
therefore, negligence as a matter of law.
''While we do not dispute the rule thus
announced in the Fritz case, we are convinced
it cannot be here invoked as contended by defendant. .As stated in 39 C. J. 862:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

!~ti

~"" 1

99

'To render the rule operative against
the servant it is neeessary that all of the
essential elements of the rule should be
present. Thus, it must appear that a safe
or reasonably safe method of doing the
work was available to the servant, that he
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable eare
should have known, of the existenee of sueh
method, that the seleetion of the unsafe
method was voluntary on his part, that he
knew, or was chargeable with knowledge
of, the danger inhering in the method
chosen, and that the danger was so imminent and threatening that a man of ordinary prudenee would not have taken the
ehances of encountering it.'
''The evidenee in this ease falls far short of
establishing as a matter of law the essential elements enumerated in the above quotation.''
In Moore v. Miles, 108 Utah 167, 158 Pac. (2d) 676
(1945), this Court again had occasion to consider the
rule invol 'Ting ehoice of methods. The Court stated:
"But defendant argues that since plaintiff
had a choice of going down the stairway into the
lobby, which admittedly was well lighted, or down
the west stairway, to the parking lot, which plaintiff testified was dark, she was negligent as a
matter of law because she chose the unsafe route.
A similar situation was presented to the court
in Williams v. City of New York, 214 N.Y. 259,
108 N.E. 448, 449, and it was there said:
'Another point urged against the
plaintiff grows out of his conduct on the
occasion of the accident. He had slipped
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down on the sidewalk just before he fell
the second time and broke his leg. He
pursued his way along. the icy sidewalk
instead of crossing the street to a sidewalk
which was entirely clear. This, it is said,
was contributory negligence, not merely
justifying, but requiring, the nonsuit. It
may have been contributory negligence as
a matter of fact, but we think it was a
question for the jury. In Twogood v.
:Mayor etc., of New York, 102 N.Y. 216, 6
N.E. 275, it was held to be a question for
the jury whether a plaintiff was chargeable with contributory negligence in venturing upon a walk in an icy condition
when she might have avoided all danger
by going upon the walk on the other side
of the street which was clear and safe.'
''In the face of such facts, the court still held
in the Williams Case that the question of contributory negligence was for the jury. A similar
case is Tillotson v. City of Davenport, 232 Iowa
44, 4 N.W. 2d 365, 366, where the court likewise
held that the question of contributory negligence
was for the jury. The court said:
'It is well settled that mere knowledge
that a walk is dangerous, unsafe for travel,
is not sufficient to establish contributory
negligence though there is another way
that is safe and convenient, and to defeat
recovery it must appear that the traveler
knew or as an ordinarily cautious person
should have known that it was imprudent
to use the walk. Templin v. City of Boone,
127 Iowa 91, 102 N.W. 789; Reynolds v.
City of Centerville, 151 Iowa 19, 129 N.W.
949; Gibson v. City of Denison, 153 Iowa
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320, 133 N.,V. 712, 38 L.R.A., N.S., 644;
Travers v. City of Emmetsburg, 190 Iowa
717, 180 N.,Y. 753; Lundy v. City of Ames,
202 Iowa 100, 209 N.W. 427; Franks v.
Siou..."{ City, 229 Iowa 1097, 296 N.W. 224.'

~.

"'In view of the foregoing authorities, and
the long established rule in this jurisdiction, that
contributory negligence is a question for a jury,
we hold that the issue of contributory negligence
·was properly submitted to the jury by the trial
court.''
The trial Court's instructions herein criticized were
given upon requests made by defendant. Defendant's
counsel were undoubtedly misled by the rule stated in
35 .Am. Jur., p. 680, Master and Servant, Section 250,
wherein that text-writer states as follows:
''In determining whether the employee was
responsible, in any degree for the happening of
the calamity, one plain criterion is this: If the
employee, having had an opportunity of acting
in one of two or more ways, of which one was less
safe than another, and knowingly chose the less
safe mode, he is to be deemed negligent and disentitled to recover although the employer may
also have been negligent.''
However, as established by the CondJie case, the
rule is stated too broadly. The authorities cited by the
text-writer failed to support such statement of the law.
He cites the following cases:

Dilley v. Primos Chemical Oo., 64 Colo. 361, 171
P. 1146, citing R.CL;
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Germarn-Amerioarn_ Lumber Co. v. Bammah, 60 Fla.
70, 53 So. 516, 30 LRA(N S) 882;
1

New York, C. d!; St. L.R. Oo. v. Bamlin, 170 Ind.
20, 83 N.E. 343, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 881, 15 Ann.
Cas. 988;
Schoultz v. Eck(J;rdt Mfg. Co., 112 La. 568, 36 So.
593, 104 Am. St. Rep. 452;
Balt.imore Boo1t d!; Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Jamar, 93 Md.
404,49 A. 847,86 Am. St. Rep. 428;
Hurst v. Kansas City, P. d!; G. R. Co., 163 Mo.
309, 63 S.W. 695, 85 Am. St. Rep. 539;
Cleveland, A. & C. R. Co·. v. VViorkmarn, 66 Ohio
St. 509, 64 N.E. 582, 90 Am. St. Rep. 602;
Stratton v. C. H. Nichols Lumber Co., 39 Wash.
323, 81 P. 831, 109 Am. St. Rep. 881 ;
Anno.: 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 646.
In Dilley v. Primos Chemioal Co., supra, the trial
court directed a verdict for the defendant and such ruling was affirmed on the ground that plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Plaintiff
was a miner and he and his partner rode a tram car
down a steep grade when the two men could have walked
behind the car and checked its speed as it progressed
down the grade. The Court quoted the rule expressed
in Oolonado & So. Ry. Co. v. Reyrnolds, 51 Colo. 231,
116 P. 1043, 1044, as follows:

'' * * * where a person has a choice of two
methods of performing his work, the one safe and
the other dangerous, and is aware of this fact,
it is his duty to choose the safe method. If he
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does not, and chooses the method which necessarily exposes hin1 to danger, which would have
been avoided had he chosen the other, and is injured, he cannot recover for such injury.''
True it is that the court quoted from 18 R.C.L. 636,
"Jf.aster and Serrant, Section 132, as follows:
'• If the employee having an opportunity of
acting in any one of two or more ways, one of
·which is less safe than another, and knowingly
chooses the less safe mode, he is to be deemed
negligent and disentitled to recover although the
employer may also have been negligent.''
However, as can be plainly seen, the language in such
quotation does not express the rule as set forth in the
quotation from the earlier Colorado case. It is further
to be noted that the quotation from Ruling Case Law
cites the same cases as does American Juris prudence,
with the exception of the Dilley case, and our discussion of those cases, we submit, will establish to the satisfaction of any one that the rule expressed in Ruling Case
Law and American Juris prudence is incorrect.
The court in the Dilley case relies on further grounds
of contributory negligence as shown by the following
quotations :
''Not only did the plaintiff choose the less
safe way of working, but after getting on the
car he took no precautions for his safety, and did
not attempt to get off the car as the speed increased. He admitted that he could have stepped
off before the car attained increased momentum,
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and that he knew from what he had seen before
that the car gained a great deal of speed in going
downgrade.''
The next case cited IS that of German- Amerioa;n
Lumber Co. v. Han;na.h, supra. In that case plaintiff in
going for a babbit ladle passed over a ten-inch plank
which was very close to a 'turning shaft. A projecting
screw caught on his clothing and he was injured. A verdict for plaintiff was reversed and the court stated:
"Where dangers are obvious and the servant
is capable of appreciating them, a warning as to
such dangers by the master is unnecessary.''
"It is not a case of using one of several usual
means for discharging a duty * * * . But it is a
case of the use of an obviously dangerous means
when safe means were available.''
In the case of New Yrork, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hamlin, supra, plaintiff, a railroad switchman, was riding
on a lead car being shoved to a coupling with a standing
car. While moving at two miles per hour he dismounted
and walked in front of the moving car and attempted
to open the coupler. His leg caught on a nail and he
was injured. The evidence disclosed that he could in
safety have stopped the train and then adjusted the
coupler. In performing his duty as he did the court held
he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law. The rule was there stated as follows:

lr

'' * * * When there are two known ways of
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if the servant Yoluntarily and knowingly chooses
the unsafe way, because easier and more convenient, or for other personal reasons, he will be
held guilty of negligence and if injured by reason of such negligence he will have no remedy.
" =~~= =~~= =~~=He had both knowledge of the hazard
and the authority to make the safe way available; and haYing, with his eyes open, voluntarily
chosen the unsafe way, \Ye see no escape from
bringing his case within the operation of the rule
before stated. * * * At the tin1e he selected the
unsafe method he had before him two safe ways,
both available, and both under his absolute control, and neither of which would have delayed
the movement of the cars more than one minute.''
In Schoult.z 'C. Eckardt ~l!fg. Co., supra, plaintiff
while fixing a belt on a saw hit his hand against the saw
and his fingers were cut off. One of the grounds of
negligence relied upon by plaintiff was that he could not
stop this saw without stopping the machinery of the
mill. The evidence, however, disclosed that plaintiff
could have stopped the saw had he so desired. The court
stated the rule as follows:
''If, therefore, he incurred any extra risk
he did so voluntarily. If there is a safe and unsafe way of doing a thing, and the servant knows ·
it, or ought to know it, and chooses the unsafe,
and is injured, he cannot recover against the
master for the injury.''
In Baltimore Boot & Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Jamar, supra,
a freight elevator fell on plaintiff and injured him. The
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butorily negligent in going under the elevator if it was
necessary in the ordinary and usual performance of his
duties and if he had been assigned to this duty as a
convict and was compelled to obey. This instruction was
held correct in view of other instructions that plaintiff
would be contributorily negligent if he might have
operated the elevator from outside without going under
it, or if he saw it was cut, or if he did not heed calls
to stand out of the way of the elevator. There is absolutely no statement in this case which would indicate
that plaintiff would be contributorily negligent as a matter of law if he chose a less safe way of performing
his duties. A reading of the case discloses that the
court clearly had in mind the situation where a servant
has an obviously safe way of performing his duties and
knowingly chooses an unsafe method.
In Hurst v. Kans'as City, P. & G. R. Co., supra,
plaintiff boarded a moving caboose. He could have
stopped the caboose before mounting. The Court stated:
"Plaintiff had the choice of two ways to
board the caboose-one that was not dangerous
(that is, having the car to stop) and the other
that was dangerous (that is, boarding the car
. while moving at a rate of speed of about six
m.p.h.). He chose the latter. There was nothing
to distract his attention and no excuse whatever
for his attempt to board the car at the time and
under the circumstances. The rule of the defendant did not require him to do so, and having
voluntarily chosen the way of boarding the car
which was dangerous he must be held to have
been guilty of contributory negligence.''
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The court quoted with approval the rules laid down in

Bailey on Personal Injuries, as follows:
'' • • • "\Yhere an employee of a railroad
knowingly accepts a dangerous way, when a
safer one is apparent to him, and he is thereby
injured, he is guilty of contributory negligence.''

.Also:
· '"\Vhere a person having a choice of two
\\-ays, one of which is perfectly safe, and the
other of which is subject to risks and dangers,
voluntarily chooses the latter and is injured, he
is guilty of contributory negligence.''
In the case of Cleveland A. & C. R. Co.

Workman,
supra, the deceased was using a speeder on a main line
track and an extra train ran into him. There was a side
t:.

track on which he could have gone with absolute safety.
A verdict for plaintiff was reversed because of the refusal of the trial court to give an instruction that if
the defendant chose to ride on a speeder on the main
line track with a friend in violation of an order of his
superior for no reason connected with his employment,
when there was a passing track on which he could have
ridden with absolute safety, and he chose to go on the
main line track without keeping a lookout, he was guilty
of contributory negligence. This instruction involved in
the Cleveland case is certainly greatly different from the
instruction that was given in the case at bar.
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In Stratt>on v. C. H. Nrichols Lumber Co., 39 Wash.
323, 81 P. 831, 834, supra, deceased in doing the work assigned to him as a servant could have stood in a perfectly
safe place without coming near or in contact with an
operating shaft with which he in fact came in contact.
The contention of the defendant, which was upheld by
the court, was expressed as follows:

'' * * * where a servant has an opportunity
of doing work in two ways, one safe and the
other dangerous, and accepts the dangerous
method, he is guilty of contributory negligence."
The annotation cited by the text writer, 19 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 646, has nothing to do with the rule stated by the
text writer. The subject of that annotation is" Servant's
Assumption of Risk of the Master's Breach of a Statutory Duty."
The annotation in 15 Ann. Oas. 995, referred to by
the text writer, is one entitled "Contributory Negligence
of Servant in Failing to Choose Safer of Two Ways to
Couple Cars." The Annotator states the rule he gleans
from the cases as follows:
"It is well settled that where a servant knowingly selects a more dangerous way to couple
or uncouple cars when there is a comparatively
safe way of which he knows or ought to know,
and which he may choose, and he is thereby injured, he is guilty of contributory negligence
and cannot recover.''
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"'\Ye respectfully submit that the foregoing authorities cited and relied upon by the text writer of American
Jurisprudence do not support the rule as there set
forth. A n1on1ent 's consideration will reveal that for a
workman to choose a less safe course of doing his work
cannot be contributory negligence as a matter of law.
The fundamental rule of contributory negligence is that
a person must use the care that a reasonably prudent
person would use in looking out for his own safety.
There are, of course, situations in which the conduct of
an injured person may be such that all reasonable minds
would agree that he did not use such care. In that event
he would be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. However, the choosing of a way less safe than
another does not require a finding of contributory negligence for the simple reason that a reasonably prudent
person, knowing both ways, may have chosen the less
safe way. This is clearly pointed out in the quotation
from the Utah Condie case, above quoted. This distinction is clearly pointed out in Bailey v. Prime Western

Spelte.r Co., 83 Kan. 230, 109 P. 791 (1910), wherein the
Court stated:

" * * * However, it may be observed that at
common law the adoption of a method not so
safe as another does not necessarily constitute
contributory negligence. The course pursued
must in addition be so dangerous that a reasonably prudent person would not adopt it. * * *
Therefore, the fact that the decedent used his
hand instead of a shovel does not convict him
of contributory negligence.''
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In this case there was evidence that the hook on the
safety chain on the caboose was smaller than the ordinary and customarily used hook. Deceased certainly
was not required to anticipate the negligence of the
defendant under that evidence in supplying that particular hook. The only possible reason which could make
the place near the front of the caboose less safe than
another would be that the chain and hook were not adequate for the purpose of protecting deceased and their
inadequacy was due entirely to the failure of defendant
to furnish the ordinary type of hook and chain.
This principle is well illustrated by the case of
B.rinkmeier v. Missouri Pao.ific Ry. Co., 69 Kan. 738, 77
Pac. 586, 588. In that case plaintiff, in attempting to adjust a drawbar at the time of a coupling operation, used
his foot and one of the drawbars being out of line slipped
by the other and injured plaintiff. A directed verdict
for the defendant was reversed. The Court stated:

'' * * * The plaintiff did not know and was
not bound to anticipate, that the drawheads would
pass each other, and it is only on the assumption
that no man of ordinary prudence would have
used his foot to control the refractory bar that
plaintiff could be declared to be negligent as a
matter of law.
" * * * The law is plain that a plaintiff may
not recover for injuries resulting from his voluntary choice of an unsafe method of doing his
work when a safe one is open to him. * * * But
to be unsafe a method must be such that a reasonably prudent man would not, under all the
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circun1stances adopt it. The question must always finally be resolved with reference to that
standard. If seYeral ways be open, and one of
them be such that a reasonably prudent man
'vould choose it, no negligence can be imputed to
the choice, even if all the others be absolutely
safe.''
It is to be noted that the court here again places
emphasis upon the fundamental proposition that the
question is whether or not a reasonably prudent man
would have chosen the place or method which was chosen
by the deceased. This proposition was not left to the
determination of the jury, but the jury was instructed
as a matter of law that to choose a less safe place than
some other, regardless of whether the place chosen was
dangerous and regardless of whether or not the place
not chosen was reasonably safe, was negligence as matter of law. So far as the instruction given is concerned,
the jury might well have thought that the safer place
which deceased did not choose was the one inside the
caboose with the door shut and in considering this matter the jury was not told whether or not the convenience
of performing the duties of his employment had anything
to do with the choosing of the place to work. The instruction eliminated any consideration of the appearances of safety to deceased. True it is that after the
event it may be that a person could say that a position
chosen was less safe, but that, we submit, is not the
test. The test again is whether or not a reasonably prudent person would have chosen that position. This
principle is well illustrated by McEl~igott v. Ra;n.do,lph,
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61 Conn. 157, 22 A. 1094, 29 L.R.A. 181 ( 1891), wherein
the Court stated:
''Plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was
sitting upon the hub of the wheel engaged in his
work. This position was a convenient one for him.
It was apparently to his observation at least, a
safe one also. That, as between two apparently
safe positions, he failed to choose the one which.
proved to be safe in fact, certainly cannot be
ascribed to him as negligence.''
Another case of interest is that of Bell v. Terminal
R. R. Assoc. 10/ St. Louis, 322 Mo., p. 886, 18 S. \V. (2d)
40. This was an action for personal injuries founded
upon state law, wherein plaintiff in alighting from an
engine slipped on the icy steps and fell. The jury was
instructed that if plaintiff was aware of the ice and
snow on the steps and that a reasonably prudent person under like or similar circumstances would realize
that there was danger of slipping if he stepped thereon,
plaintiff was not entitled to recover because of contributory negligence. This instruction was held error and
a verdict for defendant was reversed. The Court stated:

'' * * * the plaintiff would not for that reason
be guilty of negligence in using the icy steps. A
servant cannot be convicted of negligenee 'unless
the danger' is ' so glaring' as to threaten immediate injury * * * . The instruction is erroneous
and prejudicial.''
The proper approach to the problem involved is well
set forth in Mid-Continent Pet.roleum Corp. v. Hane,
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56 F. (2d) 989, 991, 992 (10 C.C.A. 1932). Defendant
appealed from a judgment in favor of plaintiff. Defendant contended that the deceased was contributorily negligent as a matter of la\Y. In carrying water to prime a
pump in a shed he carried it over a 2x4 which was between the wall of the shed and the pun1p. He slipped or
tripped on this 2x± and fell into the cog wheels and was
killed. Defendant contended that deceased should have
gone around the pump the other way and that his failure to do so 'constituted contributory negligence as a
matter of law. The Court stated:
"Where there are two ways, one comparatively safe and the other dangerous, known to
the servant, by means of which he may discharge
his duties, it is want of ordinary care for him
to select and use the more dangerous way. * * *
''In determining between two ways of performing his duties, both of which are attendant
with danger, a servant is not guilty of contributory negligence if he makes such a choice as a
reasonably prudent man under the circumstances
might have made, even if future events indicates that he chose unwisely. * * *
"Where uncertainty as to the existence of
contributory negligence arises either because of
a conflict in the testimony or because, the facts
being undisputed, fair minded men will honestly
draw different conclusions from them, the question is not one of law for the court but of fact
for the determination of the jury. * * *
"It follows that Landrum was not guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law, unless
it can be said that the danger of the route whJch
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he undertook to travel was so great and so obvious that fair minded men would agree that a
person of ordinary prudence under the existing
circumstances would not have undertaken it.''
The rule of law which ·defendant seeks to invoke
is also illustrated by the ease of Atlantic Coast Lilne R.
Co. v. Davis, 279 U. S. 34, 49 S. Ct. 210, 211-12, 73 L. Ed.
601, wherein the Court stated:

'' '* * * he voluntarily abandoned the safe
position on the running board which he at first
assumed, and placed himself in a position of extreme danger on the 'jack-arm', a place not furnished for the performance of this work, and illadapted thereto, and one of obvious danger in
which he would inevitably be struck if the boom
made a full swing unless he moved out of its path;
and thereby through his own negligence, as the
sole and direct cause of the accident, brought
on his own death.''
We submit that it was substantial and prejudicial
error for the court to give Instructions Nos. 11 and 12,
for the reason that a finding of the facts therein set forth
does not constitute negligence as a matter of law. Plaintiff also submits that the giving of Insruction No. 12
constituted prejudicial error for the reason that there
was no evidence which would justify a finding that any
negligence of the deceased in assuming a position near
the chain was the sole proximate cause of the injury
and death of the deceased. Croft stated, as hereinabove
pointed out, that it was proper for hrakmen to perform
their duties_ at any point on the platform and that when
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he operated the tail hose he usually stood where J orgensen was standing when Croft last saw him.

In Thomson v. Boles, 123 F. (2d) 487, 492, (8 C.C.A.
1941), a similar situation was presented. In that case
the plaintiff was employed as a brakeman and was on
the day of his injury engaged in getting signals to the
engineer of a work train employed on the defendant's line
in driving piles in a certain bridge. Plaintiff admitted
that he was leaning against the guard rail when it gave
way and resulted in his injures. The Court stated:
'' * * * But does plaintiff's admission that
he was leaning against the railing bar his right
to recovery herein¥ The evidence indicates that
employees of the train crew during similar operations frequently leaned or lounged against a railing of this kind. The very limited area in which
they were obliged to work and pass one another
would tend to induce such position. Plaintiff
merely did that which other employees did under
similar circumstances. His own immediate superior assumed a similar position just prior to
the accident. The evidence does not indicate that
he subjected the railing to an extraordinary
strain, nor was the position he maintained or assumed one which was inherently dangerous. The
danger arose because of the defective and wornout fence rail, the condition of which plaintiff
was not informed or aware. Such conduct could
not be held, as a matter of law, such a departure
or abandonment of a safe place to work provided
by the employer so as to relieve it from liability
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on account of a negligently and carelessly constructed and maintained guardrail. Clearly,
therefore, it was for the jury to determine
whether plaintiff, in carrying on his work on the
day of the accident, assumed any position in
leaning or lounging against the rail which was
contrary to the usual and customary practice.
Moreover, the departure, if any, from the usual
and customary practice would not he a complete
defense, but would merely constitute contributory negligence. Terminal Ry. Ass 'n. of St. Louis
v. Farris, 8 Cir., 69 F. 2d 779; Norfolk & W. R. Co.
v. Riggs, 6 Cir., 98 F. 2d 612; Rocco v. Lehigh
Valley R. Co., 288 U. S. 275, 53 S. Ct. 343, 77
L. Ed. 743. The question of plaintiff's contributory negligence was properly submitted to the
jury, and the negligence, if any, of plaintiff in
assuming the position he did under the circumstances, if the same contributed to the accident,
would not defeat recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.'~
We submit that under the evidence the jury would
not be justified in finding from the fact that deceased
stood by the chain, that the sole proximate cause of his
death was neglect on his part, when the very purpose
of the chain was to prevent men from falling off the car.
Its inadequacy for that purpose must necessarily have
contributed to the death of plaintiff. Any negligence
which might be attributed to the deceased could only
be contributory negligence and not a complete defense
to this action, yet Instruction No. 12 permitted the jury
to reach such result.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

117
GROU~D

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN RECEIVING DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT "4", THE
MOVING PICTURE FILM, IN EVIDENCE AND PERMITTING DEFENDANT TO DISPLAY SUCH FILM TO THE
JURY IN LIEU OF ARGUMENT.
~loving pictures cannot be introduced in evidence
until it has been made to appear that the pictures will
-enable the Court and jury to understand or apply established facts to the particular matter at hand. Moving pictures cannot be introduced to contradict sworn
testimony in the absence of sworn contradictory evidence.
Moving pictures cannot be used for the purpose of
supplying contradictory testimony, where none such has
been otherwise introduced. ~loving pictures are illustrative and dependent in nature and cannot be received
as independent evidence. We believe that this principle
has been established by decisions of this Court.

In Dederichs v. Salt Lake City Railroad Oompawy
(1896) 14 Utah 137, 46 Pac. 656, 657, the defendant offered three photographs showing the locality where an
accident occurred. There was testimony that the pietures accurately showed the condition of the train and
the general location of the accident. Plaintiff objected
and the pictures were excluded by the court. On appeal
this Court set up the rule which we feel is still applicable
to all photographic evidence:

'' * * * that photographic scenes are admissible in evidence as appropriate aids to the
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jury in applying the evidence, whether it relates
to persons, things, or places. It is a well-established rule, applied in everyday practice in courts,
that diagrams and maps illustrating the scenes
of a transaction, and the relative location of objects, if proved to be correct, are admissible in
evidence, in order to enable the court or jury
to understand and apply the established facts to
the particular case. ''
It will be noted that the court said the purpose of
photographs was to enable the court or jury to understand or apply the established facts to the particular
case.
The next Utah case dealing directly with photographic evidence is Johnson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 35
Utah 285, 100 P. 390. In the Johnson case photographs were offered of a wreck taken the day after the
wreck had occurred. It was objected to on the ground
that some of the conditions had been changed since the
wreck and that some of the ties which had been torn up
were broken and bunched. No valid objection could be
taken that the photographs did not illustrate the condition of the wreck over which there was no controversy.
Pictures were allowed over the objection of the defendant and the rule established in the Dederichs case cited
above was reiterated, the court again saying that photographs were admissible in evidence to aid the court or
jury to apply the facts proved to the particular case.
Having this background in mind let us look at
other authorities relating to photographic evidence.
There can be very little doubt but what the same basic
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principles which govern the admission of still pictures
governs the admission of motion pictures. After all motion pictures are but a series of still pictures. Courts
state, however, that a greater degree of caution should
be exercised in admitting motion pictures because the
dangers of false prospective or intentional fabrication
are very great. Two basic questions in laying the foundation for the admission of motion pictures then assume
great importance. First, the accuracy of the motion picture, and second, the relevancy of the motion picture.
Jezcell1llorri.s r. E. I. Dupont, 129 A.L.R. 352. Wigmo.re
on Eridence, Vol. 3, Sec. 798 (a), p. 203.
~\.s

to accuracy and relevancy, both the problem of
accuracy and relevancy are satisfactory where an accurate picture is taken of the actual scene of a crime
or accident prior to the time that any material change
has taken place. The accuracy difficulty is also answered
where the parties can stipulate that the scene of the
accident or crime has been reconstructed accurately.
However, we have found no case after an exhaustive
search of all the authorities which has allowed a moving
picture to be shown where the only purpose of the moving picture was to show one or the other of the parties
theory or contention and that theory or contention is
disputed. There can be no doubt whatever that artificial
reconstruction in which a moving picture is involved
would involve great and special risks of misleading.
Pandolfo v. U. 8., (7th C.C.A.) 286 F. 8. In the Pandolfo
case the district court judge when he discovered that
the pictures which plaintiff proposed to show had been
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taken and produced under the direction of plaintiff's advertising manager, excluded them forthwith, recognizing
the danger of exaggeration, and that the pictures would
not show the normal situation in the plan where they
were taken.
In another United States Circuit Court case the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, DeCamp
v. Unit·ed St,ates, 10 F. (2d) 984, 985, held that moving
pictures were properly excluded. In that case the defendants offered moving pictures in evidence to refute
the principal charges of the government, which charges
accused the defendants of fraudulently representing that
glass caskets could be made. The following quotation
states what we believe the law to be and sets down sound
legal principles which we ask this court to apply:

'' * * * It was to meet this evidence that the
moving picture was produced and offered. We
think the court was right in refusing to admit
the picture in ·evidence. A motion picture does
not of itself prove an actual occurrence. The thing
reproduced must be established by the testimony
of witnesses. While the photograph may be a
proper representation of the thing produced, yet
the testimony of witnesses is required to verify
the production. 'Theoretically, of course, the
moving picture can never be assumed to represent
the actual occurrence; what is seen in it is merely
what certain witness·es say was the thing that
happened, and, moreover, the party's hired
agents may so construct it as to go considerably
further in his favor than the witnesses' testimony
has gone, and yet any moving picture is apt to
cause forgetfulness of this, and to impress the
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jury with the convincing in1partiality of Nature
herself. In Yie'Y of these inherent risks of misleading, the trial judge n1ay well deem a picture
unsafe and inadmissible, when the introductory
eYidence has not convinced hin1 that the risk is
negligible.' ( 3}' "\Yignwre on Evidence, Sec. 798.)
'' Testin1ony was produced on behalf of the
defendants tending to show the process of manufacture of glass caskets of different sizes and in
all stages, and with this evidence before the jury
it was for the trial court to determine whether a
photograph or moving picture, such as was offered, was sufficiently verified as a proper representation of the process of manufacture as it actually existed. This court will not assume, on
this record, to determine this question, and if,
as contended by counsel for appellant, the testimony relative to the process of manufacture completely verifies the picture, then he cannot successfully claim injury from the refusal of the
court to repeat this testimony to the jury by a
moving picture display of the facts already in
evidence. This is not the case of a photograph
used to show the relative position of different objects, or to reconcile disputed issues of fact. The
proof as to conditions of manufacture at the Oklahoma plant were testified to by witnesses presumed to be familiar with existing conditions;
hence the admission of the motion pictures would
have amounted to nothing more than a spectacular display of a situation based upon facts in evidence.''
See also Sprifnkle v. Da·vis, 111 F. (2d) 925 (4th
C.C.A.). Aside from the inherent dangers of motion pictures an examination of photography and its

n~e
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trial of a lawsuit will he enlightening. The soundness of
the two Utah cases, heretofore cited i.e., Dederichs v.
Salt Lake City R. Co., 14 Utah 137, 46 P. 656, and Johnson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 35 Utah 285, 100 P. 390, is
demonstrated by a great number of cases. See 83 A.L.R.
1315; 129 A.L.R. 361; Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 3, Sec.
798, p. 201; L.R.A. 1917 F 980. The principles which
all of the authorities we have examined establish is to the
effect that photography is only admit;sible to enable the
court and jury to understand and apply the established
facts to the particular case.
At a very early date in the case of Babb v. Oxford
Baper Company, 99 Maine 298, 59 Atl. 290, 292 (1904)
the principle was established that photographs are not
admissible to demonstrate a party's contention or theory
of how any particular accident occurred. In the Babb case
the plaintiff was an employee whose job it had been to
keep two conveyor belts which carried coal, clean of
debris and in proper working order. Plaintiff had been
stationed in a narrow. space between the two conveyor
belts. As he was bending over inspecting one of the conveyors, something fell from the roof, presumably a chunk
of ash or coal and hit him in the head causing him to
lose his balance and his foot to be injured by the conveyor belt. The question most seriously in dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant, his employer, was
as to how the accident occurred. Defendant offered
photographs of the place where the defendant was injured, with men in various assumed positions, which the
plaintiff they contended had been in. The lower court
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refused to allow the photographs in evidence. His ruling
was upheld by the Supreme Court of ::Maine in the following language :
''To be admissible, photographs should simply show conditions existing at the time in question. But photographs taken to show more than
this, with men in various assumed postures and
things in various assumed situations in order to
illustrate the claims and contentions of the
parties, should not be admitted. An examination
of the excluded photographs show that they fall
within the latter class. They would serve merely
to illustrate certain theories of the defendant as
to how the accident happened. They were properly excluded as a matter of law.''
The Babb case, we believe, is good law. Following
the Babb case we have the Supreme Court of the State
of Oklahoma taking up and considering the question
which was before the Maine Court.
In Colonial Refining Co. v. Lathrop (June 6, 1917)
64 Okla. 47, 166 P. 747, 748, the Oklahoma Court considered a case in which the plaintiff, an employee, was
burned with sulphuric acid. He was assisting another employee to fill jugs from a large tank of acid on defendant's premises. As the two employees were filling the
jugs, plaintiff's testimony indicated that a jug, partly
filled with acid, began to slide off the vat in which the
acid was stored and plaintiff, in order to prevent the
jug from falling, grabbed it and the acid contained in
the jug was spilled upon his face and hands. Defendant
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offered photographs which showed a man standing in
the assumed position upon the tank or vat where plaintiff had received his injuries. In each picture, in addition to the n1an, a jug was shown to be sitting in different locations on the top of the tank. The trial court refused to allow the pictures in evidence and this ruling
on appeal was sustained by the Supreme Court in the
following language:
''The Court * * * properly refused to admit
in evidence these pictures, which were intended
to illustrate a hypothetical situation, and to explain the theory of the defendant as to how the
injuries complained of might have occurred.''
The court then cites the B·abb case and Stewart v. St.
Parul Ry. Co., 80 N. W. 855, 78 Minn. 110. This latter case
was an action by a husband for personal injuries to his
wife. The wife having stepped off a street car into a
hole in the street. Defendant offered pictures to show
distance from the car step to the hole. These pictures
were not admitted, the Court saying at page 855:
''Photographs are frequently admitted in
evidence as either secondary or demonstrative
evidence according to the method of their use.
In this case the photograph was evidently off·ered
as demonstrative evidence. As such they are competent whenever it is important that the locus in
quo or any object, person or thing be described
to the jury. In such case they serve to explain or
illustrate and apply the testimony and are aids
to the court or jury in comprehending the questions in dispute as effected by the evidence.''
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The pictures in the Babb case, in the Colonial Refining case and in the Stewart case were still picturesthey were not moving pictures, and when the court in
those cases properly excluded the photographs because
they were atten1pts by one party or another to establish
his contentions through the use of pictures of hypothetical or reconstructed scenes, they did so without considering the greater danger of fabrication and misrepresentation which the moving picture involved. (See
DeCamp v. United States). For other examples of courts
excluding still pictures 'vhere they were taken of reconstructed or hypothetical scenes, see Field v. Gowdy,
(1908) 85 N. E. 884. The court excluded picture of
water flowing onto plaintiff's sidewalk offered by defendant to disprove plaintiff's contention. Everson v.
Casualty Co., 9-1 N. E. 459, Massey v. Ivester, 33 P. (2d)
765, Empire Oil & Refiining Co. v. Fields, 112 P. (2d)
395, 27 A.L.R. 913.

.

We have searched diligently and have not been
able to discover a single case in which a motion picture
of an artificially reconstructed scene has been allowed
in evidence to show the sway or movement of a railroad
car or other vehicle. There are several cases in which
the use of motion pictures for that purpose have been
prohibited by the courts. In this regard the case of
Stat,e fior the use ~of Chima v. United R·ailwa;ys & Electric
Co., 162 Md. 404, 159 Atl. 916, 83 A.L.R. 1307, 1315, is
an example. In that case the trial court excluded a
moving picture of a railroad car, which picture was offered for the purpose of showing that the sway of the car
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was unusual or extraordinary. The court there in sustaining the lower court's exercise of discretion said:

·::J,

'' * * * In the moving picture, the car, because of greater speed, might possibly have
swayed more than the car in which the accident
took place. If so, the sway of that car could not
be relied upon as representing the movements of
the car in question. Moreover, the rapidity of the
movement or the sway of the car appearing on
the screen was subject to the manipulation of the
cameraman who to·ok the picture of the car. It
was within his power to make the movements appear faster or slower than the car was actually
going. Questions of convenience and possible confusion in the courtroom might have to be considered. When moving pictures might and might
not be used advantageously and properly in placing the facts before juries is a question the answer
to which must vary with one case and another,
and we think the decision in each case must be
left largely to the judgment and discretion of the
presiding judge, without any restricting general
formula laid down to control him. In this case
there were other available means of proving with
a0curacy the movements of the car, and we do not
see any ground for holding that the court acted
erroneously in excluding the resort to moving
pictures.''

fol

(See the annotations following the Chima case, which
discussed rather fully the use of moving pictures.)
Another important case in which the exclusion of
the trial court of motion pictures taken by one of the
parties to demonstrate his theory of the evidence was
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upheld is Jlon·is r. E. I. Dn Pont De Nenwurs & Co.,
139 S. ,Y. (2d) ~18-1, 129 ~\.L.R. 352.
Following the JI orris case are cited several of the
which haYe been decided on the question of the
use of moving pictures.

cases

~\case

not noted in the A.L.R. citation is Hadrian v.
11/ilzcaukee Elec. Ry. atnd Transportation Co., 1 N. W.
(2d) 755 ( 19-12). In the Hadrian case the plaintiff offered
a moving picture which demonstrated her theory of
how she was injured. The picture was of a railroad car
coming around a turn and passing a safety zone. Plaintiff had placed various dummies on the safety zone to
show how the train as it came around the curve overlapped the safety zone and would knock the dummies
over which were placed on the zone. The trial court
allowed the motion picture to be shown to the jury
and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the trial
court because of this ruling, the court stating that the
movies could not help, that these pictures did not represent distance, they misrepresented it.
A great number of moving pictures have been allowed in evidence for an entirely different purpose, many
to show an actual event. For instance, moving pictures
have been used a great number of times to show a plaintiff who is claiming to be totally or seriously disabled indulging in the normal activities and moving about in
ways which he claims he is unable to do. A good example
of this type of case is Boyarski v. G. A. Zilmmerma;n
Corp., 370 N. Y. Supp. 134.
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All of the authorities agree on one other fundamental proposition, i.e., before a moving picture can be
shown to the jury a foundation must be laid, which foundation shows and demonstrates to the court that the pictures which are being offered accurately and truly reflect the event which they claim to depict. Before the pietures can be admitted anything exaggerated or minimized must be explained by the person offering the pieture to the jury. In this connection the angle in which
the picture was taken, the speed at which the camera
was run, the way that it was developed, the exposure
conditions, the projector and the screen as well as the
competency of the operator must be considered by the
court before he can exercise the discretion that is his.
In this connection see 27 Ill. Law Review 424 (Dec. 1932)
and Wigmore Vol. 3, Sec. 798 (a) p. 203.

:rrar

Motion pictures cannot be admitted in evidence until
a proper foundation has been laid and in this connection
the judge's discretion is a reasonable one and one which
must not be exercised arbitrarily. Cincinrnati H. & D.
Ry. Co. v. DeOnzo, (Ohio 1912) 100 N. E. 320.
In this connection we call the court's attention to
the fact that all of the witnesses, which includes those
who testified on behalf of the defendant, testified that
the caboose upon which the plaintiff was riding swayed,
jumped and moved excessively and yet the picture which
the defendant offered and which was admitted by the
court did not show the extent of this swaying, jumping and movement. Counsel for defendant used the picSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ture not only to contradict his own witnesses but the
plaintiff's witnesses and for this purpose all the cases
which we have been able to discover state that photographs and n1oving pictures are incompetent. Photographs and moving pictures can only be introduced for
the purpose of illustrating and demonstrating the facts
which have been proven by the testimony and witnesses
produced at the trial. These moving pictures improperly
recei\ed in evidence were used by the defendant in lieu
of argument and the error committed in their admission
was thereby multiplied. This was prejudicial error.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Honorable
Clarence E. Baker exercised sound and just discretion
in granting plaintiff's motion for new trial; that no
abuse of discretion has been shown and. that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK & ROBERTS
WAYNE L. BLACK
Cou.nsel for Plailntiff and Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

t

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

